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MOLOTOV-RIBBENTROP PACT AND LATVIA: PROBLEM STATEMENT

1. The Non-aggression Pact between the USSR and Germany, signed on August 23, 1939, in historical literature often called the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, with its secret additions was an unlawful and cynical deal of the two powers on the expense of the third countries, hard to find analogue in the modern history of Europe. The Pact sanctioned an aggression, gave the "green-light" to the World War II and opened to the USSR its way westwards. It was a pact of military sharing and perishability.

2. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact fixed partition of Eastern Europe into German and Russian spheres of interest. Latvia, along with Finland and Estonia, was "handed to" the USSR. It significantly changed the country's role in the international relations system and devaluated its previous policies to a great extent. When the beginning of war in Europe on September 1, 1939, created preconditions for Soviet aggression in the Baltic Region, pursuing the previous policy of neutrality was burdened for Latvia. Opportunities for diplomatic maneuver reduced greatly. Actually Latvia found itself in a desperate position, loss of independence was only a matter of time.

3. In the difficult international situation the leaders of Latvian foreign policy were not equal to their task. They were not able to solve the existing problems. Although having information on the point of the felonious agreement between Germans and Russians, they did not realize the true gravity of the situation and did not look for opportunities of saving national independence intensively enough. Concessions to Russia's pressure began to dominate its foreign policy. The choice in favor of such policy was made in the beginning of October 1939, when the USSR brought its troops to the borders of the Baltic States and Latvia was threatened with immediate Soviet invasion.

4. In September and October 1939 the USSR forced the Baltic States to sign Pacts of Mutual Assistance, stipulating the stationing of Soviet military force and war bases in territory of the Baltic States. The pacts ushered in the beginning of the end of the Latvian, Lithuanian and Estonian independence, and was a prelude to the events of June 1940. Before the complete loss of their independence the Baltic States lost their neutrality and became protectorates of the USSR. "Mutual recognition of national independence" emphasized in the agreements meant nothing in fact.

5. Concession to the USSR's pressure was regarded as a "violently imposed act" by the Latvian government. However it honestly fulfilled the Military Bases Pact, hoping for the same attitude from the USSR. It planned to tolerate the restrictions of its sovereignty until the end of the World War II. To save the
nation's manpower, any decisions on military resistance to the USSR were refused.

6. Under the circumstances when the Baltic States actually found themselves under the Soviet rule Germany hurried to save Baltic Germans. On 28 September 1939, signing a special addition to the Pact with Moscow, it assured departure of local Germans from Latvia and Estonia on international level. The last preparations for the departure were done on 30 October, when a corresponding agreement between Latvia and Germany was signed. It served as a legal base for the departure of Baltic Germans, which was to finish in the middle of December. Latvia was abandoned by a "national group", which had done inestimable cultural work.

7. After German invasion in France, Belgium and the Netherlands began in May 1940, the USSR made use of the advantageous international situation and stirred up direct preparations for entire occupation of the Baltic States. On June 16 the USSR presented Latvia with an ultimatum, demanding resignation of the Latvian government and introduction of unlimited additional Soviet military force into Latvia. The government of K. Ulmanis yielded to the threat of using force, accepted the ultimatum and resigned. Military resistance was refused by the Council of Ministers, considering that it would cause a bloodshed but would not save the Latvian statehood. The government of K. Ulmanis did not decide to put up even a symbolic resistance or to express a diplomatic protest to Moscow. Such an attitude was obvious and hard to explain political purblindness.

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THE USSR AND LATVIA RELATIONS, 1938-1940

1. In the Versailles – Riga system Russia (the USSR) was a revisionist country aiming at destroying the system of international relations and retrieving back the losses of 1917-1920. The only country, which could be the USSR’s ally in pursuing the mentioned goal, was the Nazi Germany. After Hitler came to power Moscow wished to continue the Rapallo policy, however, at that time, it was outside Hitler's plans. While never giving up attempts to reconcile with Germany, Moscow in 1934 –1935 tried to “intimidate” Berlin into reconciliation by using the projects of Eastern pact. When various schemes of the pact failed in 1935, the USSR continued secret attempts to reach a compromise with Berlin. Moscow was unwilling to make any commitments in the Baltic: it turned down Latvia’s proposal (July 1935) to sign bilateral agreement of mutual assistance.

2. In 1935-1938 the USSR policy with regards to Latvia was passive: its main aim was preventing the growth of the German and Polish impact: due to its
relative weakness Moscow could not ensure that and the German effect on foreign policy of Baltic States increased.

3. After the Munich conference (1938) Moscow continued the former policy: although it publicly warned the Baltic States not to incline towards Germany: note to Latvia and Estonia in March 1939, it did not wish to assume any unilateral responsibility in the Baltic and patiently waited for the opportunity to reconcile with Germany. During the negotiations with England and France it intentionally delayed the agreement by putting forward artificially invented arguments (for example, potential for indirect aggression in the Baltic).

4. The USSR tactics was precise: when Japan rejected to sign alliance with Germany, Hitler was forced, end July 1938, to seriously consider Moscow. During the contacts between Germany and the USSR on 19 August Molotov offered Germany to sign a non-attack agreement with a secret appendix as an integral part of the agreement, thus carving up the Easter Europe. This put an end to the game of the Baltic States. The agreement of 23 August, through the USSR perspective, was turned against the status quo in Europe: it was turned against Great Britain, France and Poland – status quo countries – and it was aimed at destroying the Versailles – Riga system.

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THE BALTIC TRAGEDY.
THE BALTIC STATES AND NATIONS IN THE POLITICS OF USSR AND NAZI GERMAN ON THE EVE AND DURING THE WORLD WAR II

1. History of the Baltic countries on the eve of World War II and during the war to a great extent was deformed by the Soviet historiography. After 1991 the Soviet historiography was almost not concerned with these problems at all. In general works the annexation of Baltic countries to the USSR in 1939 – 1940 sometimes is treated as reversion back to Russia of the areas lost in 1917-1920.

2. On the eve of World War II the Baltic States, which had enjoyed independence for almost 20 years, in terms of political system were authoritarian presidential republics, where the democratic order established after the events of 1917 was changed. In terms of economic characteristics they were mainly agrarian countries, more or less successfully emerging from the depression of the first half of the 30s. Particularly outstanding achievements marked the development of national culture.
3. At the end of the 30s in their foreign policy the Baltic countries pursued the policy of neutrality. However they found themselves in a complicated geopolitical situation between the two totalitarian regimes – the Nazi Germany and the communist Soviet Union, both preparing themselves for an attack war. At the end of 30s their expansionist endeavours became apparent – while overtly expressed by one of the countries, they were more at a discreet in case of the other one. These endeavours were aimed at the Baltic States.

4. Failure to establish a common security system in Europe (Munich) combined with the on-going German expansion (Austrian Anschluss, annexation of Sudetian region in 1938 and Czech - in early 1939) clearly outlined the complicated situation of the Baltic States, especially as Germany was advancing (resolution of the case of Memel in their favour). Already during the English – French – Soviet negotiations in the summer of 1939 the USSR clearly defined their claims to include also the Baltic States in the sphere of its interest on a pretext of military strategic and geopolitical considerations.

5. The well-known Soviet - German agreement of August-September 1939 transferred the Baltic States to the interest sphere of Moscow. The agreements, signed under the circumstances of threat, on mutual assistance with Estonia, then Latvia and Lithuania enabled Stalin, by promising a guaranteed security, to dislocate in the territories of these countries his military forces, which were nearly as large as the armies of the respective countries and far better in terms of technical equipment. From March 1940 (after the end of Soviet – Finnish war), and especially since April 1940, as military operations were activated in the West, the Baltic States saw increasingly reinforced activities by the communists and in May there were Soviet press assaults targeted at the Baltic States. Various provocations were skillfully staged and the discontent with the authoritarian regime existent in part of the population was similarly made use of. The inflow of large subdivisions of Soviet Army began in June began, provided a cover for the Sovietisation process to be carried out. The Baltic States became Soviet Socialist Republics within the USSR.

6. A “model of Soviet totalitarian socialism” was introduced in the Soviet republics already starting from June 1940, an integrated part of which was a permanent terror that often implied a social genocide. This was the beginning for arrests and deportations with continuous growth in scale. In August 1940 there was the first wave of reprisals that touched upon the political and intellectual elite of the Baltic States. The deportations reached their apogee when “socially dangerous elements” were deported en-masse on June 13-14, 1941 with tens of thousands of victims. Terror and deportations possessed elements peculiar to a civil war. The fast introduction of “socialist economic system” had a detrimental effect upon the national economy and the living standards of inhabitants. In the Baltic States very rapidly grew public discontentment, even among those who supported Sovietisation in 1940. Part of the population connected their expectations of liberation with the arrival of Nazis. In point of fact, the Soviet policies threw a large part of the Baltic peoples into the Hitler’s embraces.

7. The German attack to the USSR on June 22, 1941 became a detonator for anti-Soviet uprising that could not help but complicated the situation for the
Red Army in this region of military actions. Disregarding the resistance of the Soviet Army, Germans seized almost the whole area of the Baltic States within two months. Already back in thirties the Nazis had envisaged the Baltic as a target for germanisation. A ruthless occupation regime with terror and repression of any sign of resistance was established. If compared to the Soviet regime, the state sovereignty was not even seemingly retained. The Jewish population, as elsewhere in Europe, was subject to extermination. Only after the failure of the Blitzkrieg Germans agreed to grant a certain self-governance to Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians. However in 1943-1944, by making use of the existent fear among part of population that the Soviet power may return, there was carried out “a voluntary- coercive” mobilisation in German armed forces. Whereas also within the Red Army there were created national Latvian, Estonian and Lithuanian military units, for the Baltic nations the war acquired peculiar features characteristic of a civil war, which continued even after World War II was over, until the beginning of the 50s.

8. The liberation of 1944-1945 made by the Soviet Army did not bring and could not at that time bring forth the restoration of sovereignty of the Baltic Republics, yet an appearance of sovereignty was restored in the form of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Formally within the USSR existed 3 Baltic Republics with all the attributes of statehood. In the midst of all this illusory and even theatrical situation of statehood, there was still a hope that under certain circumstances these forms might gain a real content and a true sovereignty would be restored. And this happened at the end of 80s and beginning of the 90s.

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CONSEQUENCES OF THE MOLOTOV – RIBBENTROP PACT CONTINUING INTO OUR DAYS: INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ASPECTS

The consequences of Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact (hereinafter : MRP) in the Baltic States have not been liquidated yet.

I. Legal Science

Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (hereinafter referred to in short as: Latvia) have restored their independence and claim to continue the respective pre-war republics. This claim, however, is challenged by some authors of legal publications who advance, among others, the following arguments:
Latvia has lost her independence in 1940 as a result of being incorporated into the USSR. It is admitted that the incorporation took place in the presence of Soviet armed forces, but Latvia had expressed consent with their entry.

Latvia’s consent was obtained by coercive methods, yet international law at that time did not prohibit the use of force.

In view of the fact that Latvia and the USSR were not involved in a military conflict, the USSR acts cannot be classified as occupation. However, the incorporation of Latvia into the USSR may be considered an annexation inasmuch it was brought about by compulsory means and resulted in a transfer of sovereignty.

These arguments can be refuted. But here is not the time and place to do it.

II. Practice of States
Latvia defined her position on May 4, 1990 in the Declaration on the Restoration of Independence, in the Declaration of 1996 on the Occupation of Latvia and in other acts. Did Latvia, after regaining her independence, denounce the consent expressed in 1940?

(2) Russian Federation: denies continuity. This gives rise to the border problem (Abrene) and the citizenship issue of those inhabitants who settled in Latvia after 1940.

(3) Third countries: most of them recognise the continuity of Latvia; a few countries consider Latvia a new state (separated from the USSR), some other countries evade a direct answer.

III. Practice of International Organisations

United Nations, International Labor Organisation: try to avoid the issue of continuity.

European Parliament: recognises continuity.

(3) Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe: defined the criteria for the admission of states to the European Union, confirmed in the Balladur Pact of 1995. The criteria include the settlement of territorial conflicts and the resolution of minority problems.

Conclusion: Comparative Legal Aspects

(1) Europe outside those countries which became victims of Molotov – Ribbentrop Pact:
   a. Condemnation of German aggression by the Nuremberg Tribunal (1945).
   b) Consequences of aggression are eliminated. Independence is re-established, for example, in Austria and Czechoslovakia (both lost their independence in
1938). Germans were expelled, for example, from Czechoslovakia (1938). Territories annexed by Germany from France and Belgium in 1940, were returned.

(2) Europe within the area of those countries which became victims of the MRP:
   a. The MRP has been condemned by the Federal Republic of Germany (1989) and the USSR Supreme Council (1989).
   c. Finland and Rumania: Peace Treaties (1947). Territorial issues are resolved.
   d. Baltic states?
1939-1940 there were discussions about "the Baltic choice", whether to side with Germany or the Soviet Union. During the German-Soviet war, this question arose again. What were the aims of Germany, the Soviet Union and the Western Allies with respect to Latvia? How did the various Latvian groupings view their own situation and possibilities whilst living in conditions as an occupied people?

1. The aims of Germany were declared in terms of the "New Order in Europe" (Neues Europa). Concrete plans for re-ordering Europe and Eastern Europe were secret. In contrast to the New Order for Europe, the Eastern plans as well as the "Eastern general plans" were to be put into effect already during the war. Latvia had to become a part of the German Lebensraum.

2. The Soviet goals with respect to the war were declared by Stalin in December, 1941, with the minimal demand for the renewal of the borders of the SSSR to correspond to those that existed June 22, 1941. These goals were openly made known by the USSR Foreign Commissar V. Molotov after the signing of the treaty of co-operation with Great Britain May 26, 1942.

2a. The goals of the "exile government" of the Latvian SSR were identical to those declared by Stalin.

3. The Western Allies silently accepted the goals declared by Stalin but did not succumb to pressure in recognising the de jure incorporation of the Baltic countries into the SSSR. In contrast to other countries under German occupation, the Baltic diplomats were not allowed to form exile governments, were not allowed radio transmission to the Baltic countries under German occupation and gave no official support to national (non-communist) resistance movements.

3a. Latvian (Baltic) diplomats centred their efforts around the Atlantic Charter signed by the governments of the USA and Great Britain August 14, 1941. Latvian diplomats stood for the reinstalment of an independent democratic state.

4. The groupings in Latvia cannot with ease be classified as either those that co-operated with the German occupation powers or those that opposed them totally ("National fractions", the "Ulmanis' clique", "Valdmanis' supporters", "Germany-friendly circles", economic groupings", "military groupings", "the intelligentsia", the "Self administration", the "Latvian Central Council" et. al.). With regard to questions on the legal status of the state, demands varied between the groupings, but as the occupation continued, demands for the renewal of an independent (democratic) state increased. The basic demands with respect to the legal rights were: 1. the revoking of all legislative acts of the [first] Soviet occupation (i.e. the return to the pre-Soviet laws of Latvia); 2. the definition of the status of Latvia within "the New Europe"; 3. the non-recognition of the SSSR occupation; 4. the status of autonomy; 5. the renewal of an independent state. The legal
representatives scrutinising legal rights of the state defended the continuity of the Latvian republic, that it did not cease to exist during its illegal occupation by the Soviet Union.

Germans classified Latvians into three groupings: 1. National (chauvinist) groupings against everything German (and Russian) and struggling on behalf of the renewal of an independent state; 2. "The intelligentsia clique" that looked to the West for renewal of independence and 3. the bourgeois groupings that were dubious about independence (also in the "New Europe") and who saw the German civil administration as their masters.

The secret services of the Germans and the Western powers regarded the Latvian attitude as follows: the Latvian attitude was dominated by fear of the Russians and hatred of the Germans. The Latvians themselves emphasised their instinct for survival as a people. During the Second World War there never was and never developed a united and generally accepted Latvian leadership that could muster and direct these instincts and emotions into a political stance and purposeful activity.

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PRECONDITIONS FOR COLLABORATION DURING THE FIRST YEAR OF THE SOVIET OCCUPATION

At the end of 1980-ies heated discussions took place on the matter whether the Latvian Republic was or was not occupied by the USSR on the 17 June 1940. Today the question seems having got its answer (in Latvia at least). Several aspects of collaboration, though, still remain terra incognita. Up to now almost only the Latvian Communist (Bolshevik) Party and its satellite organizations were definitely accused of collaboration. Although, once we recognize the fact of occupation, we must suppose that everyone who anyhow contributed to the new régime was a collaborationist. On my opinion although, several circumstances would have to be considered before making such a statement.

1. Latvia for quite a long period was a part of the Russian Empire. The Soviet totalitarian regime could not reconcile itself with the loss of significant territorial possessions and manpower resources after the collapse of Russia resulting from the World War I.

2. Although forbidden, the Latvian Communist Party continued underground activities in the Latvian Republic during 1920-ies and 1930-ies, due to the support coming from the Soviet Union. The objective of the party was
establishing of the Soviet form of government and incorporation of Latvia into the USSR.

3. Soviet secret services were active in Latvia during the independence period, striving to incline local intellectuals (including journalists) favorably to the Soviet Union and to carry out pro-Soviet propaganda in mass media. The success of these actions was to a great extent determined by the negative image of Germany and Germans developed historically in the Latvian society.

4. "Syndrome of a small country" in the Latvian society. During the 2nd half of 1930-ies the society and ruling circles were equally afraid both of the Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. The fear proved to be reasonable on the 23 August 1939.

5. The so called Bases Pact of 5 October 1939 gave the Soviet Union a chance to prepare for the occupation. The ruling circles of Latvian Republic although kept up an illusion of maintaining the sovereignty of the state (to a limited extent at least). This illusion did not fully disappear even after the 17 June 1940.

6. The gradual abolishing process of Latvian independence after the occupation made a wrong impression of the developments in Latvia in foreign countries as well.

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**COLLABORATION IN LATVIA, 1941 – 1945**

Since the 1980s historians have subjected indigenous collaboration, the active assistance given by individuals and institutions in the nations conquered by the Nazis to their new rulers, to ever greater scrutiny. The topic has attracted a large number of scholars, most of whom have focused on the experiences of particular countries. Many of these studies approach the issue of collaboration through an examination of the objectives of German policies, their implementation in specific areas, and through the study of the collective indigenous reaction in the individual occupied country, the expectations, actions, adjustments, and participation of the local populations and their leaders. This study of collaboration in Latvia, a paper to be presented in June at the International Conference an the Second World War, Riga, Latvia, will look at the direct assistance given to the German occupation authorities by local institutions and individuals and their individual and collective contribution to the realisation of Nazi objectives in the Baltic states.
Even before the invasion of the former Soviet Union and the German military occupation of the Soviet occupied and ruled Baltic states began, the Wehrmacht made preparations for indigenous collaboration through its contacts with anti-communists in Germany and in Latvia. Several thousand so-called Baltic Germans, Latvians of German descent who had resettled in the Reich, served as interpreters and translators with Wehrmacht units and with Einsatzgruppen, operating under the jurisdiction of the German Security Police and SD. Within Latvia, members of nationalistic and anti-communist organisations, such as the Pērkonskrusts and Aizsargi, aided the Germans. In a number of communities, for example, members of the Pērkonskrusts took over administrative positions and were active in the formation of local self-defence units, including the infamous Latvian Auxiliary Security Police, the Arajs Kommando. A February 1944 report on the Pērkonskrusts noted that “after the entry of German troops, they made themselves almost entirely available to the German Security Police and later participated heavily in the annihilation of the Jews in the district of Latvia”. Members of local indigenous police forces collaborated with the German Security Police in carrying out the mass murder of Jewish citizens of Latvia, and this involvement is well documented through requests for property from Riga ghetto, police reports, statements made by participants, and Security Police reports.

The collaboration of various members of the Latvian judiciary is also well documented, as they assisted the Nazi occupiers in identifying and eradicating political opponents. The large number of arrests of political suspects during the summer and fall of 1941 led to the calling of a meeting on November 24, 1941, to discuss the review by indigenous courts of those held in custody. Representatives of the courts in Riga, particularly local judges reviewed the arrest reports and interrogations taken by the Latvian Security Police in order to determine if the charges were justified. By late 1941, the jails and make-shift internment centers in Riga and others cities, called provisional concentration camps or replacement prisons, were over flowing with prisoners, alleged socialists, communists, or Soviet sympathisers, many of whom faced certain death for their political views or activities. Throughout the summer and fall large numbers had been taken out by local indigenous auxiliary units and shot.

Similar patterns of collaboration took place among other professions. For example, a circular issued on November 11, 1941, to the directors of the city hospitals in Daugavpils, Rēzekne, Ludza, Liepāja, Ventspils, Jelgava and Jēkabpils authorised the sterilisation of Latvian women married to Jews. Nazi efforts to deal with so-called “Jewish mixed marriages” in the Baltic states involved local doctors and local hospitals. The topic generated considerable discussion during the fall of 1941 and culminated in a lengthy directive from the Reich Commissioner for the Ostland.

The Nazi occupiers depended upon local indigenous collaborators to carry out its racial policies in Latvia and the other Baltic States. Increasing, the German regime relied upon municipal offices in the exploitation of the labour of those Jews remaining alive and in the seizure of their property. The acute shortage of labor, for example, led to cooperation between the Nazi civil
administration and the labour office in Riga which issued identity cards to the Jews from the ghetto sent to work at other locations. The payment for this work went directly to the city’s Financial Office. The exploitation of Jewish labour continued through 1943, and according to an April 1943 report, some 250 local offices, businesses, and construction sites exploited Jewish labour, and about half were operated by Latvians.

A kind of forced collaboration began in late 1941 when labour offices throughout Latvia began registering workers who were to be sent to the Reich, to Germany, to work in the factories that maintained the war effort. The efforts to recruit skilled workers, however, met with little success.

In conclusion, one will never know the full extent of Latvian collaboration, the precise nature of all the assistance provided by local indigenous institutions, agencies, and individuals to the Nazi occupiers, nor will one be able to fully identify the reasons motivating those who collaborated. It is, however, clear that without such assistance, without the active cooperation given by indigenous police forces, the judiciary, some local agencies, members of the medical profession, and various businesses, the fulfilment of Nazi policy in the Baltic states, including the destruction of the Jewish population and the subjugation of the country’s political and economy life and the mobilisation of resources in support of the German war effort, would not have been possible. Indigenous collaboration in Latvia, as in other nations of eastern and central Europe, went far in enabling the Nazis to implement their policy of conquest and genocide.

* NOTE: the views expressed here are solely those of the author, and this paper does not necessarily reflect the officials views of the U.S. Department of Justice.

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COLLABORATION AND CRIMES TO HUMANITY IN OCCUPIED BALTIC STATES IN 1940 – 1941 AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THE WORLD WAR II

The object of the article is the formation of a group of local collaborators and their actions to consolidate their societal status in 1940 – 1941. We shall not go into details of the events, although beyond any doubt, those details had a major impact for the formation of a complex of causes and effects part of which belong to war crimes. We shall focus on the year 1941, during which the Lithuanian consciousness experienced big transformations.
Already in June 1941, the basis for the support of the Soviet regime had been formed in Lithuania. Communist organisations (CO) was the main source that raised the supporters for the Soviet regime in annexed Baltic states. The national compositions of the CO in Lithuania on 22 June 1941, was as follows: up to 46.44% - Lithuanians, 12.6% - Jews and 40.95% - Russians. Within a year the number of Jews in the CO ranks had shrunk three times where as the number of Russians accordingly increased three times through immigrants from the USSR. The policy of the Stalin regime in Baltic states at the very least matched the destructive communist scheme in the Soviet Union in 1937. However, there was one essential difference. The biggest enemies of the regime were considered those Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians who were politically and socially minded. It is evident from the fact that the lists of the so called "enemies" had to comprise up to 320 000 entries of the members of pre-war Lithuania’s parties and organisations. Since the action of arrests directly or indirectly would have effected the families of the ''enemies'', one half of the population of Lithuania would have fallen victims to the machine of the Soviet terror. The same situation was in store for Latvia and Estonia.

Annihilation of political opponents in Lithuania began on 10 April 1941 and mass terror (deportations) was launched on June 14 the same year. The latter Soviet action had the biggest impact for the consolidation of a group of local soviet collaborators. Since then on the collaborators had put themselves in a situation which dramatically determined their future life.

The outbreak of the German – Soviet war interrupted the realisation of the Soviet plans. However, even retreating the Soviets did not stop killing people. Thus, for example, in Lithuania between 23 – 26 of June they carried out 40 group-extermination actions and killed 400 prisoners, and 672 civilians hostile or not loyal to the regime.

The events which took place in Lithuania in the summer of 1941, raised some questions and doubts concerning the efficiency of the performance of international laws. The problem has not lost its sensitivity up to now. The uprising on 23 June 1941, in Lithuania ended in the foundation of a Provisional Government which restored the validity of the Constitution of Lithuania of 12 May 1938. There was no such precedent in any other occupied Baltic country. The new government did not delay and took the ruling over the country. It built anew the main governing bodies and police structures. The German recognised the Provisional Government de jure, but de facto the Lithuanian self-government was subjected to the German military government.

In the summer of 1941, many Lithuanian and German interests interwove, but of course, the Germans gave preference to their own aims. Nevertheless, between June 26 – July 17, i.e. before the Nazi Civil Administration was established, Lithuanians had been able in one or other way to accomplish their plans. From July 17 to August 6, Lithuania could only declare its interests as the consolidation of the German military administration and secret police continually grew. In pursuing their objectives the Nazis took advantage of anti-Soviet and anti-Jewish moods that had accumulated in Lithuania during the Soviet occupation. Thus the Wermacht, Secret police and the SD immediately upon their arrival made attempts to subject the activities of the Lithuanian armed formations and police units to German interests. The Germans initiated and formed two units of the Lithuanian auxiliary police. Under the command of the
3/A operational platoon some companies of the Lithuanian auxiliary police participated in pogroms against Jews. On July 11, the 3?a platoon reported to the General Board of the Reich’s Security that 7,800 Jews had been liquidated in Kaunas city.

War crimes had a decisive impact for the appearance of a new group of collaborators in Lithuania. The Nazi doctrine answered the purposes of new collaborators. People of Lithuania, shocked by the terror of Soviet deportations and disorganised by war confusion, could not or even did not want to resist against the SD special operations. However, within a year apparent changes appeared in the nation’s consciousness. The transformation manifested itself by the refusal of many Lithuanians to serve the aims of the Nazis.

During the period of the Nazi occupation the number of collaborators practically did not change and totalled to that of 1941. Moreover, it had the tendency to decrease. But we know, that Lithuania’s historical experience in 1940 – 1941 was unique and therefore, can not be universal to other Baltic nations the fate of which was more or less the same.
institutionalising of administration and provide instead a functioning self-administration without appropriate underlying legal framework for its existence and performance. To prevent a possibility of creating any springboard for Latvian government, General Directors of administration were forbidden to establish a common administration institution, for example, General Directorate. Similarly it was prohibited for General Directors to became a leader of other General Directors (General Director of Interior had to be only “the first among the equal” among other General Directors). A. Rozenbergs gave strict instructions providing prohibition to create any organisation common to all Ostland, prevention of any co-operation possibility for Eastern European countries since such a co-operation could be directed against the German interests.

3. The Functionaries of the Nazi occupation institutions expressed an opinion that after the Soviet occupation period of 1940-1941 the Latvian nation in overall was for the first time united in its hatred and fear from Bolshevism and therefore Communist propaganda and Communist resistance movement had a very insignificant support among people. A more important effect had the “Ulmanians” and the advocates of the Pērkonkrusts, although ruination of Latvian independence in 1940 caused confidence crises towards several “Ulmanians” – persons who occupied key positions during K. Ulmanis’ authoritarian rule. The requirement was to fight against the “Ulmanians” – as supporters of the rehabilitation of Latvian independence – and to preclude any possibility for them to take positions in the administration. The members of the Pērkonkrusts, though, could be used in extermination of Communists and the Jews, however it had to be remembered that during the independence of Latvia their slogan was “Latvia – for Latvians” and they had turned against both the Jews and Germans. Isolation of rural areas from the influences of Riga’s politicians and intelligentsia who were hostile to German occupation, was seen as a vital requirement. Social activities of little towns and rural areas were channelled into activities of non-political associations.

4. The Archives documents bring evidence of distrust of the Nazi authorities towards General Directors and departmental Directors of land administration. The General Director of Interior O. Dankers was recognised as unstable, the General Director of Justice - as double-dealing. The teacher of Military school Colonel A. Krīpens was considered as especially outspoken mouthpiece of nationalistic anti-German views and effecting administration officials. The representatives of German occupation were unanimous that at least a part of the General Directors had to be replaced with people who would obey implicitly to the Reich. However, at the same time, it was recognised that it would be extremely difficult to find such people as they had either left for Germany in 1939 or they were killed, or deported by the Bolsheviks in 1940 and 1941. As the only candidate who was loyal to Germany and might replace O.Dankers, the Nazi functionaries were forced to accept the former Latvian Ambassador in Germany O. Voits – no other person, more or less publicly known, was found.

5. At the initial phase of the Nazi occupation the authorities considered an option of a deporting a substantial number of socially active people and intelligentsia to
Russian regions occupied by the German army - as a means of weakening their contractions - to carry out a “European culture mission” there. An immediate wide inflow of German colonists in Latvia was seen as impossible and undesirable though, (in order not to untimely infuriate the indigenous people), yet in principle it was admitted as possible to locate the colonists in country homesteads, which were vacated by population at the deportation of 14 June 1941. Formation of military units from the inhabitants of occupied Latvia at the beginning was seen as undesirable, the threat being that formation of such units would strengthen the aspirations for independence. After the creation of Latvian Legion the Jelgava Region Commissar V.E. von Medems admitted in a meeting in early 1944 that it was exactly what had happened and that in “visions of some English–minded Latvians these three Latvian division are the first English divisions fighting against Bolsheviks. Whereas A. Rozenbergs, who also participated at this meeting, stressed that Latvians and Estonians in the battle field were fighting not for Germany but only for their own existence. Therefore, regardless their heroism in battle fields and sacrifices they might have made, Germany does not owe them much since the German nation has made far more sacrifices in protecting the European borders against the “Eastern barbarians” through many centuries.

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ACTIVITIES OF THE LATVIAN CENTRAL COUNCIL IN LATVIA AFTER THE END OF WORLD WAR II

The subject of the lecture is the analysis of activities of the Latvian Central Council (LCC), an organization created on 13 August 1943, in Latvia after the surrender of Nazi Germany's army group "Kurland" on 8 May 1945. The lecture considers rather a short period of time (8 months) and is based on documents from the archive of the former State Security Committee (KGB) of LSSR and personal evidence of several LCC members.

On the day of capitulation of Nazi Germany many LCC activists took ships and boats from Ventspils, trying to reach the 160 km distant Swedish Isle of Gotland. Only the Head of LCC Kurzeme group Voldemārs Ģinters and a few other members succeeded. Most of the refugees were detained on the sea by the Soviet Navy; some of them were sent directly to Klaipėda and later to concentration camps in Russia, some just forced to return to Ventspils.

If during the war the neutral Sweden accepted refugees from Latvia, with the capitulation of Nazi Germany it revised its attitude and, fearing the USSR, did not longer support LCC’s refugee boat actions.
A group of LCC activists continued underground activities in Ventspils after the capitulation of the Nazi Germany, although there were no such groups in Rīga or any other city in Latvia.

To preserve manpower during the post-war period LCC did not carry out armed resistance to the occupying Soviet regime. Accepting no terrorist methods of struggle and having as much as nothing of connections with national guerrillas LCC pursued wait-and-see tactics. It believed that the USA and Great Britain would fulfil principles declared in the Atlantic Charter, thereby international political situation would become more favorable to Latvia. Thus the LCC fully associated its main objective – re-establishing of Latvian independence - with help and support from the Western Powers.

LCC activists were not able to restore wireless communication, so they waited for messengers with information from the organization's center in Sweden. A group of messengers led by Arturs Arnītis illegally arrived in Latvia in October 1945. They got in touch with LCC members in Ventspils and on the general meeting of the organization, which took place in Rīga, Sarkanarmijas Str. 43 on 28 October 1945, brought up following tasks to be carried out by the LCC in Latvia:

1) to create a LCC group in Rīga;
2) to maintain permanent connection between LCC members in Latvia and the center of the organization in Sweden;
3) to get in touch with other groups of national resistance;
4) to gather information to be sent to Sweden on economic and political situation in Latvia and on repressions by the Soviet power against the people of Latvia;
5) to issue an underground newspaper.

LCC managed to carry out almost nothing of the planned actions. As a result of a widespread operation by NKGB (Peoples Commissariat of State Security) LCC members were arrested and later sentenced, therefore already by the end of 1945 LCC had to cease active work in Latvia. Although Soviet repressive bodies continued to arrest people for participation in the LCC up to 1951, most of the arrested had no actual connection with the activities of the LCC in the post-war Latvia.
ORGANIZATIONS OF NATIONAL RESISTANCE IN LATVIA
DURING THE SOVIET AND GERMAN OCCUPATION PERIOD
1940 - 1945

In spite of the lost independence and genocide by the occupying powers a strong national resistance to occupants took place in Latvia during the World War II. The known historiography works let us conclude that insufficient attention has been paid up to now to research into the history of national resistance movement and its appraisal. After the World War II in Latvia, under the Soviet occupation regime, the subject was either passed over in silence or presented in distorted and derogating manner, glorifying and putting in the forefront Red guerrillas' and Communist underground organizations' activities against German occupants.

The lecture is based on documents little used for the present, owned by the State Historical Archives of Latvia, the State Archives of Latvia, the Central Archives of Latvian Academy of Sciences, the archives of the Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the collections of the Latvian Museum of War and the Latvian Museum of Occupation, the Center for Documentation of Consequences of Totalitarianism, and State Archives of Germany (BA) and United Kingdom (PRO). To prepare the lecture, information from different sources on the national resistance organizations was gathered and analyzed, verbal and written evidence of participants of particular resistance groups on their activities was compared and critically estimated. The lecture forms an idea on the whole process of Latvian national resistance movement, trying to avoid glorification or derogation of any of the groups or tendencies, brings up the most topical historiography problems of research into the subject.

Under the Soviet occupation regime in 1940-1941 several national resistance organizations were created. They carried out anti-Communist propaganda, sabotaged orders by the occupation government and prepared themselves for armed struggle in case of possible war. The larger organizations were "Young Latvians", "Latvian National Legion", "Combat Organization for Liberation of Latvia", "Guards of Fatherland" and others. An active part in the resistance movement was taken by pupils. We cannot deny attempts to get in touch with German intelligence services carried out by part of the resistance movement. It is also obvious that the Soviet security bodies were better prepared to struggle than the resistance movement. The resistance movement, however, showed Latvian people's true national stand and attitude against the incorporation of Latvia into the USSR and stimulated collapse of the Soviet power in territory of Latvia when it was reached by the military operations of German troops.

Documents explored up to now from the period of the German occupation contain evidence on activities of Latvian Nationalist Union, Latvian National Council, Officers' Union, organizations "Guards of Latvia", "Young Regiment", "Free Latvia", "Hawks of Latvia Organization" and other larger or
smaller groups. These groups popularized in society an idea of national independence. One of the forms for expression of attitude to German occupation policies was publishing of illegal newspapers, which opposed strongly various negative manifestations of the occupation regime, and condemned collaboration of Latvians with the occupants. Illegal newspapers known up to now are "Latvija", "Tautas Balss" ("The Voice of People"), "Tālava Taurēja" ("The Trumpeter of Tālava"), "Latviešu Cēš" ("The Latvian Way"), "Zobens" ("The Sword"), "Vēstījums" ("The Message"), "Brīvā Latvija. Latvju Rakti" ("Free Latvia"), "Latvian Scripts"), "Jaunā Latvija" ("The New Latvia"), "Lāčplēsis", "Par Latviju" ("For Latvia"), etc. Illegal media can be regarded as objective reflector of the contemporary events, because they expressed free public opinion of the time, so differing from official issues, subdued to ideological treatment and censorship by the occupation regime. The Latvian Central Council, created on the 13 August 1943 by representatives of four largest political parties of the independent Latvia - Latvian Social-Democratic Labor Party, Peasants' Union, Democratic Center Party, and Latgale Christian Peasant Party - is considered until now as the most noteworthy and largest national resistance organization in the period of German occupation. LCC had the most definite stand among other resistance organizations for restoration of democratic Latvian Republic, relying on basic principles of the Constitution of 1922.

In the Latvian Resistance Movement Participants' Union, created in Detmold, West Germany in 1946, 13 former resistance organizations were represented. The total number of more or less organized resistance groups, however, reached some tens, with several hundred people actively participating in the resistance movement. The character of the movement was basically that of passive resistance, because of special situation of the Baltic countries in World War II, suffering not only from the loss of national independence, but also the repeated change of occupation regimes during a few years. Pupils and students, townspeople and countrymen, and even some members of the last Saeima of LR joined the resistance movement. Political platforms of different organizations and groups or their opinions on possible ways of restoration of Latvian independence differed. Methods of struggle varied from organizing of unreasoned demonstrative actions to serious political activities. German security bodies turned severely against participants of the resistance movement, tracing and arresting them. Many of them were imprisoned in different Nazi concentration camps, and some, we must emphasize, after the end of the World War II in camps of Soviet repressive bodies as well. The research made into the subject lets us dismiss opinions on weakness of the national resistance movement found somewhere in historiography works, and also assertions about a centralized structure of the resistance movement under the leadership of the LCC. The possibility of such centralized structure of the resistance movement is contrary to the fact, that the associations of former resistance movement members created soon after the World War II in exile were so fragmented. The specific features of the resistance movement in Latvia allows also to ask a question - how vital is the expression of a certain party's political platform or idea under circumstances of occupation, and must such an idea be subordinated to popularization of the idea of national independence, even if there is not well-grounded political program for its realization. We must emphasize that there is no sufficient research in the activities of several Latvian political and public figures during the World War II, their role being on the edge between
collaboration and some forms of resistance. In future a comparative research of the resistance movement in Latvia and in other European countries in the period of time considered would be expedient.

The subject of national resistance movement is politically important, as it could be observed from the actualization of the history of the World War II in Latvia, with tendentious formulations about connection of part of Latvian society with the war crimes of the Nazi Germany often heard. Because of that, it is so important to emphasize participation of considerable part of Latvian society in the national resistance movement, opposing both Soviet and German occupation, and peacefully popularizing the idea of restoration of independent Latvian statehood. It is important for the modern Latvia's foreign policy too, because the subject is of importance for creation of image of Latvia in international relations. The importance of the subject of national resistance movement is determined by the theme's topicality today. Active participants of the events still live in Latvia, as well as abroad. Many of them have been persecuted not only by Nazi, but also by the Communist regime. Their contribution to the struggle for independence of Latvia still has not been properly estimated. Only on 25 April 1996 the law "On Status of Participant of the National Resistance Movement" was passed by the Saeima of Latvian Republic, although its influence on the real life is not felt yet. The number of alive participants of the national resistance movement diminishes year after year. State-consciousness and national self-awareness are as vital for the existence of democratic Latvia as political and economic stability, and international security. Struggle for these concepts under the most adverse circumstances - the independent Latvian state not existing and being occupied by hostile foreign powers - is an example in history, which requires proper appreciation.

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EUROCLIO/MATRA PROJECT ON
THE DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF A
TEACHERS HANDBOOK ON THE LEARNING AND
TEACHING OF HISTORY IN ESTONIA AND LATVIA

Introduction
In 1991, the Baltic States had to rediscover the recent past. Since than academic historians have been studying this sensitive history, but their interpretations are due to political points of view, regularly changing. It will take some time before historians who personally have lived through such painful
recent past, will have the academic distance necessary for an objective as possible approach in their quest for the historical truth.

History teachers in schools cannot wait until the academic historians are ready. In their classrooms young people are sitting, who experience a present, which is very different from the childhood of their parents although this childhood is only thirty years ago. History teachers also have to face the fact that much is now common knowledge about the past, was not mentioned during their studies in university. Teachers in the history classrooms are now required to teach about urgent questions such as what were the roles and experiences of the people living in the Baltic States during this century, how did people live through these experiences and what has changed so much in the last fifteen years and why? They were never well informed about the answers themselves.

History education also have to follow the developments in history education. Knowing the facts from the past is not longer seen as the first and only aim of the learning and teaching of history. Modern history education requires pupils’ understanding of the pasty, empathy, attitudes and skills. An approach which enables them to think critically and from their own judgements and opinions.

The teacher guide, which is developed in this project, will assist history teachers in the Baltic States to meet these requirements. It helps them to teach new content and opens the debate about the purpose of the learning and teaching of history.

Key-issue for this teacher guide is to bring a sensitive recent past alive for young people with at the same time questions in mind as what do my pupils need to know from the past to live in the future and what message will be meaningful for a person in the 21st century? The authors of the guide face the responsible challenge.

In the beginning of 2000, the guidebook will be ready for implementation.

Project:

Twelve authors developed a handbook for history teachers supported by advisers from the EUROCLIO network representing the Associations from England, Finland, Norway and Scotland will operate as advisers.

Every history teacher in Estonia and Latvia should receive one copy of this handbook. It will be available in Estonian, Latvian and Russian.

The handbook will contain suggestions for lesson planning managing different types of teaching, including student centred approaches such as group work. It will offer exemplar materials, including sources, questions, assessment items and background information. It will give guidance on planning for progression and differentiation and on developing pupils' abilities. It will support teachers in using role-plays, drama, games, discussions and simulations.

Content

To make the exemplar materials directly applicable in classroom all materials will be centred around two topics:

- Democratic and authoritarian States in Europe between 1920 and 1940

These topics are approached through controversial key-questions.
Centres for the Teaching and Learning of History

The local Associations have set up small centres for the learning and teaching of history in Riga, Tartu and Tallinn.

Relation to Russian speaking teachers

Russian speaking history teachers are involved as authors and experts. Observers from Russian History teachers Association participate in the main activities of the project.

Time planning

The teaching handbook will be ready on January 1, 2000. Twelve in-service seminars will be organised in the year 2000 throughout Estonia and Latvia to implement and disseminate the handbook.
SOLDIERS OF THE OCCUPIED COUNTRIES UNDER ALIEN COLOURS

1. Since the Middle Ages soldiers of Baltic States and Eastern Europe have fought to protect their homelands not only under their own colours and in guerrilla wars, but also under alien colours. The problem of participation in war under alien colours requires a special research into the history of the World War II. As far as wartime archives of the main powers involved in the World War II are still inaccessible or insufficiently studied, and the estimations of the events by the participants on both sides, being influenced by the wartime propaganda clichés and mostly on level of private memories, remain far from the historical truth, historically unobjective and hard to integrate views on the matter occur.

2. Imperialistic ideology, multiplied by the idea of the world supremacy characteristic to Nazi and Communistic concepts, turned the World War II into a war of mass armies and ideological struggle; and heightened the fighting spirit as well as cruelty of the soldiers affected by these ideologies. During the previous centuries fighting under alien colours had been characteristic mostly to subdued small nations. The mass character of the 20th century's armies and the ideological struggle of the World War II set representatives of big and the biggest nations to fight under alien colours too. In the cases when this fighting was voluntary it can be regarded as the supreme form of collaboration - a military collaboration.

3. The domination in the occupied territory was maximum, and non-dominant nations were forced to participate in the war on the side of the occupying powers. At the beginning of the war both totalitarian superpowers strove to manage with the armies of the indigenous population, although at the end of the war many individuals and military units of non-dominant nations fought within both totalitarian armies.

4. Non-dominant nations' units were recruited by the occupying power directly or through puppet governments and "self-administrations" after longer ideological pressure against the local population.

5. All military unions under alien colours consisted of volunteers, semi-volunteers and enlisted men, including recruits caught by force. Estimation of the war by the occupied nations' soldiers depend on their participation in war campaigns in the occupied territories of other countries, in the territory of their native country and in the territory of the "retreat" country after loosing the native country to one of the enemies.

6. Non-volunteer legions were set up mostly in the countries that lacked strong tradition of national state or suffered hard oppression under occupation of
the other totalitarian power. In the age of mass armies military collaboration in the form of fighting under alien colours became a mass phenomenon too.

7. The number of volunteers and enlisted men in the German army from non-Russian population of the territories of the former USSR reached 0.5 million, while the number of volunteer and semi-volunteer Russians -1 million.

8. If personal hopes of solders fighting under alien colours were connected with freedom of their peoples and homelands, in further historical perspective their struggle actually led to thralldom and destroying of their native countries and nations resulting from the victory of the totalitarian powers.

9. No foreign formation as whole within totalitarian mass armies became a third force, capable to fight for creation of a democratic state. This strife was undertaken only by some separate units (e.g., kureliētis) and post-war period national guerrillas, formed to a great extent by deserters from the Red Army and the Vehrmacht.

LATVIAN SOLDIERS IN THE ARMIES OF GERMANY AND
THE USSR: MAIN PROBLEMS

During World War II the armed forces of the Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union recorded more than 200,000 illegally recruited inhabitants of Latvia, thus violating the Hague International Convention of 1907 on the rules of warfare. Approximately 100,000 soldiers lost their lives in battlefields. Deprived of any possibility to fight in the ranks Latvian army, their freedom of action was rather restricted.

As Latvia came under the dominance of Soviet occupation in summer 1940, its army was gradually reduced to the Peoples’ Army, then to the 24th Territorial Corps of Latvian Riflemen. On 22 June 1941, after Germany attacked the USSR, the Corps recorded less than 3000 Latvian soldiers. With military actions starting, it gradually dissolved with part of the soldiers involving in the battles adjacent to the Latvian – Russian border. In July 1941, two Latvian Riflemen regiments were formed in Estonia consisting of fighters of working guards and Soviet activists. In the battles at Leningrad they suffered heavy losses and in September 1941 the residual was consolidated in the 76th separate regiment of Latvian Riflemen, which during the further fights was put to a complete rout.
The Stalin’s order on developing a division of Latvian Riflemen is dated 3 August 1941. The 201st Division of Latvian Riflemen was started to form in the Gorohoveca camp not far from Moscow. Its staff was mainly made up of Latvians from Russia, later - soldiers of other nationalities. The 201st Division of Latvian Riflemen participated in the battles of 1942 at Moscow, Staraja Rusa and Demjanski. In October it was conferred upon a name of the 43rd Guards Division of Latvian Riflemen. At the same time the Gorohoveca camp was the location for the 1st separate Latvian Reserve Regiment, where the training was undergone by 33 000 soldiers who due to heavy losses were continuously sent to the 201st (43rd Guards) Division of Latvian Riflemen. In June 1944, as the front-line reached the territory of Latvia, on the basis of the regiment, the 308th Division of Latvian Riflemen was raised. In July 1944 the 43rd Guards Division and the 308th Division were merged into the 130th Corps of Latvian Riflemen that took part in the battles at Rēzekne, Daugavpils, Madona, Krustpils and Riga, but at the end of the war it was fighting in the Kurzeme front. Besides in 1943 were formed the 1591st anti-aircraft artillery regiment and the 1st Latvian bomber aircraft regiment, which basically were made up of Latvians.

Altogether nearly 100 000 Latvian soldiers were fighting in the ranks of the Red Army, out of which almost half were Latvians living in Russia and the Latvian inhabitants who went to the USSR in summer 1941, and another half – about 57 000 – Latvian soldiers born during the time period 1903 – 1926, who were recruited in Vidzeme and Latgale end 1994 – early 1945, with the second Soviet occupation being carried out. Many of them occurred in different units of the Red Army, while the so called Latvian national units were flown into by representatives of other nations.

More than 100 000 Latvian soldiers, born during the time period 1906-1928, were fighting within the German armed forces. At first part of them were volunteers, but later – the recruited ones. Starting from autumn 1941, battalions of Latvian order service (police) were formed, and they were used in battles in Eastern front, covering the area from the Finnish Bay as far as the Black Sea. On 10 February 1943 Hitler issued an order regarding the formation of Latvian Legion. In total from March 1943 to September 1944 in Latvia were carried out 5 major recruitment actions, which was initially justified by fulfilling the German Regulation of 19 December 1941 on introduction of obligation to work in the occupied Easter districts, but later by making a formal reference to the compliance with the Latvian Conscription Law.

In spring 1943 by Leningrad was formed the 2nd Latvian SS – Volunteers Brigade, that was fighting in the Volhova front from April 1943 to January 1944. In summer 1943 in Latvia was formed the 15th Latvian SS – Volunteers Division, but in February 1944 the 2nd Latvian Brigade was transformed as the 19th Latvian SS – Volunteers Division. Both divisions were incorporated in VI SS Corps and were fighting in Russia – by Novosokolniki, the Velikaja River, in Bardovo- Kudeveras positions and at Opolcha, but in July 1944 retreated to Latvia with heavy battles. The 19th Latvian Division continued fighting in Vidzeme – at Lubāna, Tirza, Kārzdaba, More, but at the very end of the war – in Kurzeme at Dūķste, Lestene, Blidene and Irlava. The 15th Latvian Division was sent to Germany for re-formation where some of its units from January to May 1945 were fighting in Western Prussia, Pomerania and Berlin.
The German armed forces contained also 6 Latvian regiments of border guards, 3 police regiments, several construction battalions, aircraft legion “Latvia” and other units. Latvian youth were involved in German state work service and auxiliary service of air forces.

The task of history research is to find a patent definition of armed formation of Latvian soldiers as well as establish their number and structure during World War II. While there exists a relative clearness in terms of the age of soldiers, less perspicuous until now remain the data referring to affiliation to particular Latvian districts and social groups. During the course of time - from the end of World War II up to the present – classification of soldiers into volunteers and the recruited ones has deformed, in practise it can not always be clearly defined.

There is no essential difference between the recruitment of Latvian population carried out by the USSR and the Nazi occupation power, as well as the role of the so-called Latvian self-administration and the “Latvian Soviet government” in promoting of same. It is important to clarify to what degree these “puppet governments” facilitated the achievement of goals set by the occupation powers and to what degree it was possible for them to act in the interests of Latvian nation.

The large number of the awards received by the Latvian soldiers for heroic spirit they showed in battlefields on both sides of the front. Whereas data about deserters, prisoners of war and deceased soldiers are less known and studied until now. It is possible to draw conclusions regarding the efforts of the Supreme command of both the German and Soviet army to involve Latvian soldiers in eventually more difficult sectors of battlefronts. Therefore relevant is the question of the meaning of the fighting, having especially critical attitude towards the involvement of Latvian soldiers in warfare outside Latvia – both in the territory of Germany and the USSR. Subject to comparison and critical evaluation is also the different position of Latvian officers – only blindly fulfilling the orders of the high command or considerate attitude aimed at preserving the soldiers lives.

The official ideology imposed by the occupation powers during World War II, which partly was inherited also by the post-war history literature (more in Soviet, less in exile), had created a erroneous vision on the involvement of Latvian soldiers in World War II. The discussions opened on this subject after the regained independence of Latvia, made it possible to identify significant differences in the policies of the occupying countries and the belief of the soldiers from occupied countries during the war. This is proved by the discrepancies and conflicts between Germans and Soviets – on one side, and Latvian- from other side performance in terms of separate individuals and military units.

An increased interest about the Latvian history during World War II allows us to raise a question of whether in near future a consolidation of contemporary Latvian society is possible resulting in a united understanding of the issues of our recent history, or part of the society, disregarding the specifics of World War II in Latvia, will continue dividing its participants into the “winners” and “losers” or the “good ones” and the “bad ones”. Similarly, a question should be posed of whether the positive attitude towards legionaries generally felt today among Latvians as opposed to the soldiers of the Red Army
is explained only by objective circumstances (the post-war occupation lasting for almost 50 years, a larger number of Latvian soldiers in German army than the Red army, their different fate after World War II, etc.), or this has any other reasons.

With regards to future perspective of the matters related to the Latvian history during World War II, a requirement for historically objective research and evaluation is to be emphasised. The inconsistency governed by political trends is to be done away. The main conditions for development of historical research include also contribution of appropriate material resources and existence of state ideology that is balanced on the basis of future perspective development.

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MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY UNITS IN LATVIA BESIDES THE “LATVIAN LEGION”

When discussing the "Latvian Legion" three questions need to be addressed: firstly, with respect to number, how many inhabitants of Latvia were involved in German military units? Secondly, how is the notion of the "Latvian Legion" to be interpreted? Thirdly, the activity of the inhabitants of Latvia in units other then the "Legion".

The figure with respect to the total number of Latvians involved in the various German military units varies from 100,000 to 150,000 according to the views of different scholars. Latvian authors (either in or outside Latvia) in general regard the higher figure as more correct.

The views of the German occupation powers on the "Latvian Legion" differed from those of Latvian representatives. The "Latvian Legion" (the official title was: **Lettische SS-Freiwilligen Legion**) according to Germans was the common denotation for those Latvian units that were formed within the framework of Waffen SS and police. The Latvian "Self administration" and the Inspector General of the Latvian Legion referred to the "Latvian Legion" as to all Latvian military units that were formed in the course of the war.

According to the findings of K. Kangeris, the number of Latvian inhabitants that participated in German military and paramilitary units did not exceed 115,000. Up to the end of the war some 65,000 persons were enrolled in units under the SS and outside them, some 50,000.

Before 1943, Latvians were generally involved in **Schutzmannschaften** (police battalions). Until May, 1942, these were formed on a voluntary basis, but afterwards by drafting. With the onset of the mobilisation, the largest contingent outside the SS units were so-called army aids (**Hilfswillige**, that in 1944 were renamed as **Kampfhelfer**) who were assigned to various German units (approx.
the Latvian Legion" or in other units, local resident German (Volksdeutsche, Deutschstämmige) and Russian nationals were mobilised (the number of mobilised Russians was approx. 8,000). Seven Russian police battalions were specially formed.

After evaluating opinion reported in contemporary press, the views prevalent in society and those of the soldiers themselves, one may conclude that the notion the "Latvian Legion" was then understood as to refer to soldiers enrolled in SS divisions. The opinion of the Latvian people with regard to the term "Latvian Legion" corresponded to the opinion expressed in the censored press (propaganda) that in turn reflected the definition of H. Himmler, the leader of the SS, that it consisted of Latvian Waffen SS and police units.

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HOW THE GERMANS CALLED UP VOLUNTEERS BY AGE CLASS IN OCCUPIED LATVIA

Controversy continues to this day regarding the Latvian Legion, called by the Germans the “tellische freiwillige Waffen-SS”. This paper reports my investigation of whether or no the legionnaires were volunteers, as the German title indicates, and many non-Latvians, including expert witness in war crimes trials have said from 1945 to the present. My principal sources were microfilmed records of the labour administration of the General Commissariat in Riga and microfilmed SS records, both held at the United States National Archives II; the original documents have been returned to Germany. These German records, captured by the Western Allies during and after the Second World War, show that there was systematic conscription of Latvian men by age-classes specifically for the legion, at German initiative and under German control, from very early in 1943. German control of the conscription was obscured, because public announcements were signed by Latvians such as Rudolfs Bangerskis. The first conscription had as its “legal basis” the Rosenberg labour decree; latter ones had “no legal basis”. Any conscription of Latvians by the German was, of course, illegal under the Hague Convention. I argue that where there is conscription there cannot by any meaningful voluntarism. I also briefly explore the compulsory transfer of policemen and police units into the legion. This is the source of much
of the confusion on the topic of the legion, and because it is much obscure than the conscription for the legion from 1943 on it is an area that requires much more research.

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NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT IN THE UKRAINE DURING WORLD WAR II: SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVES AND PARALLELS WITH LATVIA

The outbreak of the World War II brought to the Ukrainian nation consolidation of the majority of ethnographic lands under the USSR power, which was followed by the replacement of the Soviet dominance by another one – the rule of Hitler. Extermination threat for the nation during the war, millions of victims became a reality. In these circumstances no help could be expected from anywhere. The nation had to rely on its own internal resources. The experience accumulated during the revolution of 1917-1921 proved that this is the most reliable method for national rescue. Besides, the unleashing of the world war and the rapid changes in the world’s order, which were taking place at that time and were still observed after the war, gave rise to a strong expectations regarding a successful outcome of this struggle. There was another, probably the most valid factor supporting this struggle – the existent Organisation of the Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), whose goal was the achievement of statehood regardless any external (as well as internal) circumstances. The Organisation of the Ukrainian Nationalists was prepared to lead the way to independence by providing ideological, moral and organisational support. As the war broke out, the population of the Western Ukraine did not perceive the idea of an independent state as something unusual. The same idea could be spread over a considerable part of other Ukrainian lands.

As it is know, at the beginning of World War II Latvia found itself in a similar situation with one occupation power replaced by another one. However, an essential point was that the Latvian nation had already had its statehood over two previous decades.

A slightly unusual feature characterising the Ukrainian situation was that both the OUN and the formations of Tarass Bulba- Borovca, in their fight for independence were seeking to use the forces of one occupant against the other: Germany against the USSR. It turned out, though, that the Germans were not the least interested in the Ukrainian independence, as they viewed the Ukraine only as one of the areas to be occupied. This predetermined also the corresponding attitude towards the local population. The occupation and enslavement brought
forth a spontaneous resistance. The OUN and the Banderovian faction in particular were able to organise this resistance into a form of a direct armed struggle. Thus emerges the Ukrainian Uprising Army (UPA). But prior to this, the both wings of OUN without previous agreement attempted to establish the Ukrainian institutions in the Big Ukraine (which until the war was within the USSR), to waken the sense of Ukrainian identity, with particular success in 1941 and 1942 II. However when illegal and semi-legal activity was no longer possible, only one way – an armed struggle - was to be left. This was expressed by the creation of Ukrainian power zones, first in the areas vacated from Germans, and in general defence in armed conflicts with the occupant’s army. Involvement in an open battle –front with the military machinery of the Third Reich was senseless. The resistance movement manifested itself through partisan struggles that continuously increased.

Latvia likewise registered attempts of several smaller groups to resist the “new order” brought by the occupation of German army. However there were no appropriate conditions and experience to carry out an extensive armed struggle illegally, and the non experienced small groups of underground activities were soon liquidated by the Gestapo. Starting from August 1943, the organisation of resistance against the Nazis all through Latvia was undertaken by the Latvian Central Council (LCP). Initially it dealt only with the underground activities.

Of great significance for the Ukrainian resistance movement of that time was the ideological justification of the struggle for a consolidated Ukrainian independent state, a future perspective of the new Ukraine. A clearly articulated ideological motivation was provided already by the OUN programme. The publications of Donchov and the people closely related to him already before the war were aimed at educating the new generation, by encouraging their heroic spirit when facing the future European collisions, reminded by D. Donchov. Collision, introduction to the Soviet Ukraine of the past, requirement to assume the responsibility for the struggle involving the whole nation and the following establishment of the state, to a great extent determined a major development of the guidelines set out by the both OUN programmes. In particular this refers to the Banderovian factions of the OUN (SD), that made an outspoken appearance already at the third meeting of the OUN (SD). Further on these guidelines were well developed by the publications of P. Poltava, O. Djakiv –Gornov and P. Duma. It was them that suggested the third way between the liberal capitalism of the West with its well-known prophets and the totalitarianism that dominated in the Nazi Germany and the communist Soviet Union. Instead of that a system of economic democracy was suggested, which was close enough to the social democracy of the time. Of great interest was also the idea of the battlefront of repressed nations (and its creation). The Ukraine succeeded in developing a united authority of armed resistance, the pre-Parliament of the future independent Ukrainian state – The Ukrainian Chief Liberation Rada (July 1944).

Both the Ukrainian and Latvian, as well as other related movements found themselves in a situation tempered by a tragic air because, unlike the Western countries occupied by the Germans at the same time, the two former ones were forced to fight against the Soviet power as the German occupants were retreating. If to compare the resistance movement in the Western Europe and the Eastern Europe, then the Ukrainian movement was a national –liberation movement.
without any outside support. And as such it remained also after 1944 and World War II.

What aspects determined the internal capacity and longevity of the struggle in the Western Ukraine after the year of 1944? Objectively it was the Soviet totalitarian regime in this part of the Ukraine. The consolidation of the totalitarianism was accompanied by every expression of terror against the Ukrainian identity, against peasantry. The resistance caused a new wave of terror and reprisals.

LCP also sought to rely on military force in order to provide an efficient opposition both against Germany and the USSR’s armed forces that invaded the Baltic States. Yet the attempt to use for this purpose sub-units not created by themselves (June 1944) was a failure. Also the Ukrainian politicians did no succeed in using the formation “SS Galichina” even against the Soviet military forces.

Due to this Latvia was forced to form new organisational structures to continue resistance against the new power. There were emerging several resistance centres. Unfortunately a consolidation of all the new resistance centres on a national scale was not achieved. Nevertheless the resistance movement were felt in all Latvia, which was due to the recently experienced independence. While in Latvia, like in other Baltic States this struggle was aimed at restoring the statehood, the main goal of the Ukraine was the acquisition of same. This explains also the different ideological background of the two movements, although in both cases the movements were based on nationalism.

The aim of the struggle at that time was to maintain the nation’s potential to be able oppose the regime and to preserve the organisational structure and capacity for a more beneficial international momentum. However this momentum never came: the world and the super powers did not care much about the Ukraine (as well as Latvia). The desperate struggle continued - deprived of any hopes for a success in a foreseeable future.

The struggle against the Stalinism and totalitarianism proved that such a ruthless totalitarian regime can be opposed both ideologically and by means of arms. And the opposition is possible exactly on a national basis. The war predetermined the possibility of resistance for the Ukraine and Latvia through long post-war years.

Have all these sacrifices been in vain? The answer obviously is that they were not in vein. This struggle saved a considerable number of populations of the region from extermination and hunger, including also the Easter Ukraine and Moldova (1946-1947). Only the nation that fights for its freedom and liberation can eventually achieve it.

The Ukrainian national liberation movement during the war and the post-war period possessed an anti-imperialistic and anti-totalitarian nature. The same nature was characteristic of the national resistance movement in Latvia. Due to various objective and subjective reasons, development of a single battle front of a repressed nations stretching from the Ukraine to Estonia, or, at least, through the
Baltic, was not achieved. Yet the similar conditions experienced by the peoples of these republics resulted in a similar and, in some cases, even identical forms of struggle and resistance organisations.

Today we have implemented only a small part of the ideological-organisational legacy of the Ukrainian liberation movement of the time. An appropriate situation, efforts and time will implement the rest.

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“DEFEAT IN VICTORY”: POLISH WAR EFFORTS, 1939-1945

The wartime history of Poland moved along a twisted road from independence to enslavement. It started from the defense war of September 1939 when Poland was invaded first by the Germans and then by the Soviets. In the years 1939-41, Poles were threatened by Nazi and Soviet extermination. After 1941 the Polish government in exile cooperated with the Western allies and the Soviet Union. Following the Polish-Soviet split in 1943 and the allied decision to move the country westwards, in 1944 the Soviet armies entered pre-war Polish territory and in Yalta Poland was included into the Soviet sphere of influence.

Their country occupied and divided in 1939, Poles fought against Germany on all European fronts of the Second World War. Polish troops took part in military operations in Norway and France, during the battle of Britain, in the Middle East, North Africa and Italy. Despite a wholesale murder of Polish officers by the Soviets in Katyn and other NKVD killing grounds, two Polish armies were organised in Russia after 1941. One, connected with the government in exile, was not given a chance to fight and was evacuated to the Middle East. Another, commanded by the Soviets, accompanied the Red Army all the way to Berlin.

An extensive political and military underground was developed in occupied Poland: the Home Army connected with the London government in exile and the Communist controlled People’s Army. In the summer of 1944 the former numbered about 380 000 soldiers, while the latter about 10 000 soldiers. They also had different objectives. On the one hand, the government Delegatura and the Home Army aimed at regaining independence. The questions of systemic change was left to the parties and their democratic bargaining, but it was obvious that postwar Poland would have to go through serious reforms. On the other hand, although they disguised their goals in a populist and democratic rhetoric, the Communists were aiming at a social revolution and establishment of a Soviet controlled totalitarian system.
The hour of truth came in August 1944, when the Polish underground started the Warsaw Rising. The rising was crushed by the Germans but Stalin’s wait-and-see attitude largely contributed to the tragedy of Warsaw. Poles took up arms, were abandoned, and accused of not cooperating with the Soviets. If they remained passive, they would be accused of not fighting against the Germans and thus treated as unworthy of freedom. Heads you win, tails we lose.

It was symbolic for postwar Poland that its fate was determined in Moscow. In June 1945, sixteen national leaders were tried by a Soviet court, while Soviet agents and “realists” tried to save hope met from a new government. Few Poles thought about the coming of the Soviet armies in 1945 in enthusiastic terms and the term “liberation” had a dubious meaning. This came as no surprise. Nazi occupation of Poland was replaced by Communists control. Poland lost sovereignty and chances to form its own form of government. For Poland, a country which first resisted the Third Reich by force, the end of World War Two was a “Defeat in Victory”. 
As the Nazi forces entered Latvia they carried along with them their own intentions and language of hatred and a revenge. The most poisonous words were “pogrom”, “Selbstverreinigung” and “Selbstschutz”. All of these words were euphemisms and they hid meanings that were not evident on the surface. The word “pogrom” originated in czarist Russia and it meant locally spontaneous attacks on Jewish communities. The Germans already in 1938 redefine the word as state directed actions against the Jews. The words “self-defense” and “self-cleansing” sound like defensive and peace-loving ones, but their real German meaning was aggressively criminal. ”Self-defense” was a basic concept at the root of the Nazi ideology. It originated in the “stab-in-the-back”, which according to Hitler was performed by Jews and their associates.

The Nazis transmuted “self defense” into revenge. With the help of these words the Germans endeavored to induce the “natives” into murdering Jews and Communists.

Of the three words only “self-defense” has entered Latvian historical and memoir literature.

Military comandantures were established during the first moments of occupation, and next to them in the same towns Germans ordered the organization of auxiliary Latvian teams, that during the occupation’s first six weeks they called “self-defense” comandantures. They were organized approximately on the pattern of pre-war Aizsargi or police. There exist written documents and notices that tell us how and who organized these self-defense teams. The organization occurred simultaneously in all of Latvia, and not only there but also in the other Baltic states and in Eastern Europe at large. In the District centers there were organized district comandantures, in towns town comandantures and in the pagasts, pagasts comandantures. Altogether in 1941 there existed approximately 700 Latvian comandantures. The self-defense men were ordered to wear the Latvian colors, red-white-red, an arm-band as a mark of identification. The Germans controlled the self-defense teams in two ways: directly through German local commandantures and through Latvian District commandants. About six weeks after the occupation, in mid August, the Germans closed the self-defense teams and forbade the wearing of the arm band. There was a reason why these units were ended: the first phase of “self-cleansing” was completed—the Jews from small towns had been killed.

There exists a view that the self-defense commandantures arose spontaneously even before the Germans had entered Latvia. A broad coalition of opinion consisting of ex-Soviets, Jews, Germans, Americans and Latvians believes that the self-defense units in Latvia were locally created. Even many Latvian eyewitnesses and participators in the self-defense units believe in the spontaneity story.
What gives me a right to question this universally accepted view about the self-defense?

1. The words, self-defense and *commandanture*, first of all are found in German not Latvian sources.
2. No such organization had ever existed Latvia before.
3. The idea of “self-defense”, in its Teutonic definition, originated in Germany and had its own germanically dialectical, “stab-in-the-back” meaning, that did not have an equal in Latvia.
4. Upon entering Latvia the Germans had total control of the land.
5. In Latvia there was no native center of power that had an authority to initiate or organize a country-wide system of self-defense *comandantures*.
6. Upon entering Latvia the Germans had a low level of confidence in Latvians. They had not forgotten the burning of baronial estates in 1905, nor Latvian Bolshevism of 1917 and the Land reforms of 1920ties.

In the scheme of the “self-defense” organization there was one deceptive aspect. The pre-war *Aizsargi* organization frequently was used as the basis for organizing the self-defense units. It would be wrong to say that there were no Latvians who volunteered in the “self-defense”, but it is also true that the German military and punitive organs upon entering Latvia in effect carried out a draft.

Among all of the war-crimes and crimes against humanity that Germans perpetrated during World War II, one must add the importation of their sense of revenge and entrapping the “self-defense” men into the murder of Jews. Stahlecker, the Commander of Einsatzgruppa A, has left numerous documents in which he testifies that for the purpose of killing Jews he had proposed specially selected victims of Communism, like men whose relatives had been deported to Siberia.

What tasks did the “self-defense” forces perform? All those that their supervising German military commandants and SD men ordered them to perform. The pattern of their work varied from place to place. Most of the time in most of the places, the self-defense men performed police or quasi police duties. Their participation in the killing of Jews was not uniformly the same everywhere. In districts where there existed SD chapters the role of the self-defense units was minimal. In other districts they were in charge of arresting the Jews and keeping them imprisoned until a German or Latvian SD team arrived and carried out the killings. In some districts also the killings had to be locally organized.

In this paper I have tried to draw together the main strands of information about “self-defense” origins and work. Without understanding the role of the self-defense teams, the understanding of the Holocaust in Latvia will elude one. The discovery of the role of the self-defense *comandantures* will also lead one to a disclosure of the role of German military *comandantures* in the Holocaust.
EXTERMINATION OF THE LATVIAN JEWS IN 1941

Remarks on the time periods of the history of Holocaust and on the “white spots” of historiography

Similar to other Easter European countries that have regained their independence Latvia is now seeking to “conquer its past”. One of the peculiarities of this complex and sometimes controversial process in the post-communist Baltic states is the massive confrontation of the society with the crimes of Stalinist past, at a time when neither the scholarly research nor the ethical assessment of war-time history have given clear answers as to the tragic legacy of the Nazi occupation. This legacy concerns not only the Holocaust (extermination of 75,000 Latvian Jews and several thousand Jews from Western Europe, Lithuania and Hungary) but also the political terror spread by the extreme nationalists who used the change of occupying powers for the purpose of eliminating the “politically undesirable elements” (12,000 – 15,000 victims). The persecutions of their fellow-nationals animated the extremists to direct the same kind of actions against the Jews. Nazis exploited their readiness to violence in order to engage a significant number of the nationalist activists in the Jews’ extermination program. The current tendency to allow these events only a marginal place in the national history gives rise to concerns as to how democratic is the process of “conquering the past”.

Two time periods should be clearly distinguished in the history of extermination of the Latvian Jews. The first period covers the summer of 1941, with massive killings of Jews in the rural areas and selected killings of male Jews in the cities (in Riga alone at least 5,000 victims; around 35,000 victims in the whole of Latvia, as of October 15, 1941). The extermination of the Jews in this phase is not yet strictly centralized, the commandos of the Security Police and SD carry out individual bigger actions on their own responsibility (in Jelgava, Riga, Daugavpils, Rēzekne etc.). A significant role was played by the anti-Jewish initiatives undertaken by the Kommandanturs of Wehrmacht. The largest number of murders was committed by a local volunteer killing unit (the Arajs commando). Occasionally the execution campaigns were assisted by the Wehrmacht, German marines (in Liepaja), and individual subunits of the 9th, 13th, 22nd, and other police battalions. There is no evidence to the frequently-heard assertion that the annihilation of Jews in Latvia was already under way before the German invasion. However, there is no denying that without the complicity of the local units of self-defence (later, auxiliary police) in the actions against the Jews, the rural areas of Latvia would not have been “cleansed” as rapidly and as thoroughly as they were, nor would it have been possible to carry out the massive imprisionment actions in the cities on such a big scale.
The second period of the total ethnocide began in November – December, 1941. The elimination of Jews by now had become strictly centralized, led and overseen by the Higher SS and Police Leader in Ostland in accordance with the instructions from Berlin. There was no place anymore for “local initiatives”, the participation of the Latvian police and Schutzmannschaft in the massacres was held under a strong German control. By the end of December, 1941 the “final solution” for Latvia was practically achieved: out of the total of 75,000 Jews living in Latvia before the occupation only some 6,000 persons had escaped death, mainly in the “Small ghetto” of Riga and in small camps in Liepāja and Daugavpils. When the transfer of the surviving Jews to the “Kaiserwald-Riga” concentration camp was completed in autumn, 1943, their number had further decreased by 1,500. In a year, when they were deported to the concentration camps in Germany, no more than 4,000 persons had remained. Out of these only the fourth part survived the war. Some 350 Jews were saved in Latvia by the non-Jewish nationals.

The history of Holocaust in Latvia on the whole is well known. 26 books of memories have been published. A number of historians (G. Schneider, D. Levin, H.-H. Wilhelm) have published researches on specific aspects of the theme. In 1997, A. Ezergailis published a significant study, first of its kind, on the general history of Holocaust in Latvia. This allows us to have now a clearer perspective on the “white spots” of the history of Holocaust.

One of the questions still unclarified concerns the content of the orders received by the SD Einsatzgruppen. Were they from the very start secret “Führerbefehl” which demanded immediate and total extermination of the Jews? If that is the case, it is not clear how the Wehrmacht’s “Wirtschaftskommando” and later, the Nazi civil administration could manage to slow down the pace of extermination on the grounds of necessity to preserve the Jewish labour force.

An important issue for the national historiography is the mechanism of engaging the self-defence units in the massacres: was it an order given directly by the SD, or did the SD only encourage such involvement? In accordance with the infamous instruction of the RSHA, it was prohibited to “leave traces” and to give written orders. Other sources, like the Soviet Extraordinary Commission, KGB interrogation protocols and memories of the participants of the massacres do not confirm the hypothesis of forceful submittance to the orders. The Jewish historians, on their part, are more interested in the tragedy of their kinsmen, but there are very few authentic testimonies on the extermination of the Jews in the rural areas; there is only one diary that describes these events (Šeine Gram from Preiļi).

Little investigation has been made on how the victims reacted to the direct threat of death. The Jewish Documentation Centre has gathered information on the waves of mass suicide, on the efforts of the victims to preserve their national consciousness and human dignity (police reports, ghetto folklore, diaries), on the attempts of resistance. The Jews have been often criticized for their fatalist attitudes but one should bear in mind that the Jewish capacity to resistance was dependant on the support it received from the society.
The indifference of the overwhelming majority of the Latvian society to the tragedy of the Jewish people is best illustrated by the underground literature circulated around in the occupied Latvia: the Holocaust was not even mentioned neither in the publications issued by the Latvian Central Council, nor in the pro-communist and other underground publications.

The question of the reaction of the Latvian society towards the Holocaust has been touched upon only by A. Ezergailis. The conception of Latvia as a country plunged into general anti-Semitism should be unequivocally rejected. The mass passivity was rather determined by the weakness of Latvian democracy, undermined by the Ulmanis authoritarian regime, and the Soviet deportations which affected the liberal intelligencia and social democrats. The Nazi terror delivered the last blow to the democratic forces. Considering these circumstances, the courage of the people who supported the Jews and concealed them at the risk of their own lives deserves even greater appreciation. The number of the non-Jews who saved the Jewish people together with their family members and confidants could have reached several thousand persons. The materials gathered by the Documentation Centre show that the acts of solidarity and saving were religiously motivated. Baptists and Adventists were the most responsive in this respect, followed by Catholics and members of other confessions; as to their social background, the rescuers belonged predominantly to the middle and semiproletarian classes. From the geographical point of view, the people of Latgale displayed comparatively greater readiness to help the Jews than the people of other regions.

Up to now the researchers of Holocaust have mainly concentrated on the mechanisms of extermination and the balance of the victims. In the future investigations more attention should be devoted to the moral demeanour of the individuals under the extreme conditions of terror in the context of social reaction.

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THE ROLE OF LATVIA AND LATVIANS IN THE NATIONAL-SOCIALIST RACIAL AND SETTLEMENT POLICY - THEORETICAL CONCEPTION AND PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION

The paper is included in the plenary session „Crimes against civil population in Latvia during World War II“, as a racially negative classification of a nation (german: Volk, latvian: tauta, russian: narod) is to be considered as a crime against this nation.
The paper will focus on the question, which National-Socialist racial policy plans were proposed with regards to Latvia, which results they had concerning the settlement policy in Latvia – whether there were any and how they were implemented. Moreover the central place will be given to the *Generalplan Ost* in its second version. Heinrich Himmler’s „Memorandum of how to treat alien nations in the East“ („Denkschrift zur Behandlung der Fremdvölkischen im Osten“) and the first version of the *Generalplan Ost* will not be addressed here as it only contains the racial policy of the occupied Poland and does not touch upon Latvia yet. This fundamental document concerning settlement questions will be regarded in connection with documents mainly from Latvian Archives intending question of a racial evaluation of the Latvian nation. Altogether the paper is based on the materials from the Latvian State Archives of History, which excellently supplement the already published documents.

An answer should be provided to the question of what reasons, apart from the course of war, hindered practical implementation of the aims set out by the *Generalplan Ost* in Latvia. Were there already contradictions on the theoretical level of the plan?

The paper will highlight the following most relevant issues:

1. The starting point will be the classification of Latvian nation according to the German racial policy. Which different views existed on different levels of decision-making bodies and in NS-institutions about the racial structure of the Latvian nation? Which consequences had these evaluation concerning settlement plans in Latvia? What meant *Germanisation* (Eindeutschung) of the Latvian territory and what plans existed about the fate of the as non-arians considered Latvians?

2. Various theoretical plans from different NS-institutions will be focused looking at it from the aspect of contradictory and hindering each other point of views: How Himmler’s radical point of view, the plans of the *Reichssicherheitshauptamt* and Rosenbergs opinion influenced the racial and settlement policy all in all regarding Latvia? Thereby the paper will concentrate on the question, how were defined racial categories by these National-Socialist planning institutions. It will be shown, how priorities of this policy changed in the ongoing course of war.

3. Assuming from the German policy the reaction from the Latvian side will be shown. It has to be noted that Latvia as a target of German racial and settlement policy had further reaching functions, for example to provide an important potential for military facility, to serve as a site for extermination of Jews or the function of the Latvian Civil Government. Until today the academic research has been highlighted only the views of the National-Socialist leadership as the organisers of the racial and settlement policy. An analysis of the response from involved representatives of the Latvian side would be required. Latvia will not to be viewed only as an object of German intentions. It is to ask, in which way the german planners had to be carefull that an aggressive racial policy doesn’t disturb the priorities of occupation policy.
4. In conclusion there are named some reasons that hindered implementation of National-Socialist racial and settlement policy in Latvia. Undoubtedly the course of war had the most important influence on population politics. But the central question will be of the contradictions on the theoretical level of population policy. Did the priorities of German occupation policy automatically preclude the realisation of the racial and settlement aims or was it destroyed due to the specific situation? Was the theoretical division between occupation policy in the present and racial policy priorities in the future realisable? As a result the level of inner contradictions of the racial and settlement plans concerning Latvia shall be defined.

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REPRESSIONS AGAINST LATVIAN POPULATION IN 1940/1941 –1944/1945:
THE COMMON AND THE DIFFERENT

Although formally the Republic of Latvia existed until 21 July 1940, various repressions against Latvian population were started right after the occupation of Latvia in June 1940. They became increasingly intensive after a full annexation of Latvia. Repressions served to achieve both political and economic goals and manifested themselves as direct repressions – arrests, administrative deportation as well as indirect ones – dismissal, reprisals of economic nature, etc. Often it is difficult to find a line of demarcation between them. Arrests and deportation were carried out along with the adjustment of state apparatus to meet the requirements of the Soviet system, elimination of the “Aizsargi” (Latvian paramilitary organisation), sovietisation of the Latvian army and nationalisation of the large industrial companies and banks, and the land reform.

To date the total scale of repressions has not been identified yet. This is a very extensive theme, therefore this paper will address only one type of repressions – political arrests, as a source using the materials from the archives of former KGB (now Latvian State Archives, fond No. 1986): the years of 1940/1941 and 1944/1945.
Arrests in 1940/1941

- The former KGB Archives contain information about 7292 arrested persons, out of which 263 were women. 184 were arrested during the period from 17June 1940 to 5August 1940, i.e. until incorporation of Latvia into the USSR. By the time the Criminal Code of RSFSR was officially introduced in November 1940, about one and a half thousand people had been arrested.
- As the first ones were arrested the representatives of the previous state power institutions (government members, state officials, police and court employees, the Aizsargi, border guards, etc.) as well as the members of those organisations that had contacts abroad and organisations that were regarded as antisoviet.
- Arrests were mainly motivated as punishment for those persons who were fighting against revolutionary movement and the working class. The definition “fought against revolutionary movement” or “the working class” was applied very broadly. It was likewise referred to the persons that served in the Latvian army, to the employees of police and court systems and the Aizsargi. In 1940/1941, besides to the above motivation, people were often arrested as “members of counterrevolutionary organisation”, “socially dangerous”, less often as “anti-Soviet elements”. The denomination “counterrevolutionary” was in particular frequently used. It was attributed both to the political parties of the Republic of Latvia, youth organisations, anti-Soviet leaflets and songs.
The former KGB Archives contains information about 18438 arrested persons, out of which 1413 were women. Repressions formally were directed against the supporters of German occupants. The most frequently used justification for arresting people was “supporter or Germans”, which similarly to “fought against revolutionary movement” was very widely applied. In fact, any person who during the German occupation lived in Latvia could be denounced as “supporter of Germans” or “collaborator of German occupants”. As the first ones to the reprisals were subjected the persons who during the German occupation had served in self-defence units, auxiliary police, police battalions, as well as in the Latvian SS Volunteer Legion and Aizsargi. Those who took administrative positions during the occupation were likewise subject to arrests. In many cases people were accused of using the labour of prisoners of war, not immigrating to the USSR upon the outbreak of the war, or, in case of Jews, of having survived the German occupation in Latvia.

There was no substantial difference between the repressions of 1940/1941 and 1944/1945, they both were aimed at consolidation of power and ideology, elimination of the active and passive resistance, at the same time maintaining the atmosphere of fear.

In most of the investigation cases of primarily importance was seen the membership or the position taken by a person rather than his committed offence.

In 1940/1941, compared to 1944/1945, the cases of defendants were more often investigated by the Supreme Court and the Regional Court, less by the Military Tribunal and the Special Council.

While there were slight differences in applying the RSFSR Criminal Code, both in 1940/1941 and 1944/1945 people were mainly punished according to clause 58 paragraph (for counterrevolutionary crimes), in 1944/1945 reference was made also to the USSR SSP Decree of 19April 1943.

In 1944/1945 a defendant person was most often sentenced while being in a camp.

Both in 1941 and 1945 there were carried out administrative deportations.

In 1945 appeared a new type of repressions – filtration camps.
THE REPEATED OCCUPATION OF LATVIA BY THE
SOVIET UNION, 1944 – 1945

1. The strategically economic importance of the Baltic States is greater than it could be judged of their rather small territory today and historically. Belonging to the Western cultural realm but situated in Eastern Europe, the Baltic States found themselves in zone of clashes between two totalitarian superpowers - Nazi Germany and the Bolshevik Soviet Union - and during the Second World War suffered occupation by military force (occupatio bellicare) three times (in 1940, 1941, 1944-1945).

2. The political causes of the repeated occupation of Latvia by the USSR were the secret Additional protocols of the Pact on 23 August 1939 between Hitler and Stalin, as well as the passive consent to the occupation by Western democracies in the summits of Teheran in 1943 and Yalta in 1945, and their refuse to support a democratic Latvian government in exile and anti-Communist resistance movement in Latvia.

3. The Baltic States were occupied by the Red Army in 1944-1945 during the so called Baltic General Operation (the 2nd half of 1944), carried out by forces of three Baltic and Leningrad armies (fronts). The Red Army forces during this operation continued offensive in territories outside the USSR and thus turned the Great Patriotic War of the USSR into a war of conquest.

4. To realize the military occupation of the Baltic states, the Red Army here was immediately followed by troops of NKVD (Peoples Commissariat of Internal Affairs) - the 5th division in Latvia and Lithuania, the 63rd in Estonia and 4th in Lithuania; and the 48th Convoy division of NKVD, whose task was political cleansing of the local population. The existing card-index of screening lets one to conclude that more than 58,000 of local male population were imposed on screening in the three screening (“filtration”) camps.

5. During the occupation of Latvia by Germany the Latvian Soviet Government in exile was functioning in Moscow under supervision of the AC(B)P CC (Central Committee of the All-Union Communist (Bolshevik) Party). Along with the Red Army forces 11 executive units of the LC(B)P CC (Central Committee of the Latvian Communist (Bolshevik) Party) arrived into Latvia - among them the puppet government of the Latvian SSR, senior officials of city and rural district governments, and 878 Chekists (48-81 per district) - all together 1966 persons. Military and political occupation was followed by a civilian occupation. In 1944-1945 already approx. 20,000 retired Red Army soldiers who had not lived in Latvia before (43,5% of total number retired in Latvia), stayed for permanent living here.
6. All the countries of Eastern and Central Europe formerly occupied by Nazism, except Greece, became socialistic after being taken over by the Red Army.
7. The so called "extermination squads" (approx. 16,000 fighters) were formed in all the cities and rural districts of Latvia by the NKVD of LSSR in 1944. The squads carried out political cleansing and fought under guidance of troops of the NKVD of USSR against national guerrilla movement. After the second occupation of Latvia by the Soviet troops the puppet government of LSSR changed the administrative system and started changes in the social system and national structure, started turning of Latvian culture into a monoideological one. A monocratic dictatorship of the Communist Party, squeamishly controlled and on the whole financed by Moscow, was established in Latvia by the occupying power.
8. Although the tactics of occupation methods corresponded to contemporary totalitarian models, strategically the occupation of Latvia, as well as all other countries in Eastern and Central Europe by the USSR, followed the imperialistic ideals of the 19th century Russia, and reached these ideals due to the support of the Western democracies. The second occupation of Latvia by the USSR brought not only political but also demographic consequences.
9. Fifty four years ago by the passive consent of the Western democracies the secret agreement between the Soviet Union and Germany was put into practice and the iron curtain between the Baltic and the Black sea moved westwards, turning the Baltic States and Poland into colonial possessions and dominions of the Soviet Empire - the frontier line of the Cold War and a push-off base for the Red Empire in World War III prepared by it.

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EVACUATION OF THE CONVICTS FROM THE PRISONS OF LATVIAN SSR NATIONAL COMMISSARIAT OF THE INTERIOR IN 1941

Presentation plan

Reference on the number of convicted in the prisons of the USSR National Commissariat of the Interior according to the information to date June 10 1941. Reference on the number of convicts in the prisons of the Latvian SSR National Commissariat of the Interior.
Convict limits of the Latvian SSR National Commissariat of the Interior, fulfilment and dislocation.
Beginning of evacuation (the instruction by the USSR National Commissariat of the Interior from Moscow on the convicts’ evacuation, evacuation plan, report on evacuation progress.).

**Regulative documents**

Decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium of June 22 1941 on announcement of the state of war in several republics, regions and districts.
Instruction made by the USSR National Commissariat of the Interior about the evacuation procedure of the convicts.

The report of the Head of the Prison dept. of the National Commissariat of the Interior of the Latvian SSR.

**Evacuation results**

Evacuation of the convicts from the West Ukrainian, West Byelorussian, Lithuanian and Estonian prisons.
Evacuation results to date January 21 1942 of the convicts’ evacuation of all the convicts imprisoned by the National Commissariat of the Interior and National Commissariat administration of the Interior.
Evacuation results of the convicts from the LSSR prisons of the National Commissariat prisons (number of evacuated prisons and convicts, location of the evacuated convicts.

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**THE LATVIAN POLICE BATTALIONS IN BYELORUSSIA**

1941 -1944

1. During the last war in the area of Byelorussia, the German armed forces, SS, Security Police and SD formations, as well as various occupation subdivisions and commandos contained representatives of different nations, Latvians included. They were mainly recruited to contribute to the formation of the *Ostland* Supreme SS and the subdivision of the head of police (HSSPF), which was dislocated at the Minsk SD. (In some documents this subdivision is referred to as “SD Latvian company”. Latvians in that and similar formations mainly served as interpreters and regular soldiers as well as investigators, agents, etc.
The archival materials prove that they were involved both in struggles against anti-Fascist resistance as well as in extermination of the Jewish population of Byelorussia. Thus, for example, on 8 November 1941, during the mass-scale extermination action in the city of Borisova there arrived from Minsk *Obersturmführer* (lieutenant) Kraft together with the interpreter *Unterscharführer* (instructor) Aihi and 50 officers and soldiers from the SS Army, mainly Latvians.

2. Police formation created in the Baltics started arriving in Byelorussia since autumn 1941. The first one was the 2nd Lithuanian Security Battalion that arrived in Minsk from Kaunas in the beginning of October (from November 1941 it was referred to as the 12th Lithuanian Policy Battalion), commanded by the Major Impuljavicus. The battalion fulfilled security service, as well as participated in punitive actions against partisans and in extermination of the Jewish population in Byelorussia.

3. The data on the first Latvian police battalions refer to 1942. As noted by the diary entry made on 1 January 1942 by the rear service commander of the army group “Centre” General Makss von Sheckendorf: “the 17th Latvian Police Battalion is arriving and it will be used in Lepala”. According to the record to date 1 July 1942 there were four Latvian police battalions active within the area of Byelorussia: the 18th, 24th, 26th and 266th “J”.

4. The 18th Latvian Police Battalion, in total 395 people (out of them: 22 officers and 75 non-commissioned officers) arrived from Riga in 1942 in the subordination of the commander of the Policy of Order. The Captain Erzums was the commander of the battalion. The battalion was dislocated in Stobci. In summer 1942 the battalion under the command of the Major Rubenis, for several days participated in the extermination of the ghetto at the city of Slolima, in Baranovich district. The 24th Latvian Police Battalion, in total 433 people (16 officers and 78 non-commissioned officers) from Liepāja arrived in Stankova, not far from Minsk. The German signal officer of the battalion was Captain Markvarts. In late August – early September 1942, part of the battalion within the group of and under the leadership of Major Bincs was involved in the punitive operation the “Bog Fever” North in Krivichi –Dolginova region, the “Bog Fever” West in Ivencha region, the “Bog Fever” South –West in Slolima region. The military action of the battalion to a certain degree is disclosed by the entries made in the Major Bincs’ diary of the military actions of 23rd German Police Battalion. During these operations the battalion was called regiment (but from 7 September – “Bincs’ Battle Group”). The 24th Latvian Police Battalion entered this regiment (group) as an action battalion. Here is an excerpt from the diary: On 4 September 1942, at 3.00, Battle noise in the western direction. 3-12: a radiogram from the 24th Latvian Battalion: “heavy shooting in the district”. 7-15: the 24th Latvian Battalion reported on the execution of one Jew. 8-13: distribution of cars, provided to the regiment by the armed forces, between the 24th Latvian and the 3rd Lithuanian Battalions. 9-55: a radiogram from the 3rd Lithuanian Battalion: “everything quiet in the district: battle noise in the district of the 24th Latvian Battalion. On 5 September 1942 7-30: “The Headquarters’ doctor goes to the village of Novoi Dvor to exhume corps. The partisans have shot Latvians there.”. On 8 September 1942, at 4.30 a.m., the battalion, having
covered more than 250 km, arrived in Slolima region and dislocated in the village of Glosevic in order to participate at the final part of the operation “Bog Fever” “South – West”, that continued till 21 September 1942. On 8 September at 17-05 the 1st company of the battalion was fighting against a partisan unit, overall 200 people. Here is the diary entry from 10 September: At the night from 9 to 10 September 1942 there was an unpleasant collision with an unknown enemy to the south of Zirovici. Brief exchange of fire after an unsuccessful response to the password. The enemy turned out to be the platoon of field engineers of the 24th Latvian Police Battalion that during the reconnaissance had gone astray too far and lost their way back. 3 people were injured as the result of firing. One of them died within the same day”. After the operation was completed on 22 September 1942, the 24th Battalion was sent to Stolbi by rail, from where it proceeded on foot to the village of Naliboku.

5. On 27 June 1942, the 26th Latvian Police Battalion arrived in the region of Begomla – Pleschenica, the total number of people being 392 (18 officers, 68 non-commissioned officers). The battalion was recruited in Tukums. With regards to the 266th “J” Latvian Battalion it is known that is was recruited in Riga and according to the records to date 1 June 1942, it was located in Minsk. It had a list of 682 people. Out of them: 54 officers and 222 non-commissioned officers. The battalion was commanded by the SS hauptsturmführer (captain) Vihmans. In August – September the battalion participated at the punitive operation against the partisans of Zirovicu region. According to the records at our disposal during the period from August to December 1942, the following units were involved in punitive actions against the partisans and population of Byelorussia: the 15th Latvian Police Battalion (August – September), the 254th “J” Latvian Police Battalion (in October), the 271st Latvian Police Battalion (in December), the 432nd Latvian Police Battalion (July 1942). It is known that according to the order made by the Latvian SS and Police Führer (SSPF Latvia) on 7 June 1942, the 25th and 268th Latvian Police Battalion was supposed to be re-stationed from Liepāja to Brest.

6. In February –March 1943 a punitive action was carried out on the border of Latvia and Byelorussia aimed at creating a “neutral zone” within the area of 40 km, commanded by the Ostland HSSPF General Jekeln. In the operations were involved 7 Latvian battalions. In addition to that, in 1943 –1944, in the area of Byelorussia in one way or other their traces had left also the 15th Latvian Division (in 1944 participated in battles against the partisans in Polocka – Lepela partisan zone), the 2nd and 3rd Latvian regiment of police and the 5th Latvian regiment of border guards (participated at the punitive operation “Frühlingsfest”) within the Jekeln’s group, which in April –May 1944 was directed against the partisans of in Ushacka – Lepela partisan zone. There is information also about the activities of the 231st, 347th and 860th Latvian Police Battalion in Byelorussia. In one of the partisan documents dated 26 June 1944 it is mentioned that one soldier of the 546th Latvian Police Battalion had exploded on a mine. Thus on the basis of the above we can summarise that in the area of Byelorussia their traces had left: one Latvian division (the 15th), 15 Latvian Police Battalions (Schutzmannschaft) – No 15,17,18,24,25,231,254,266 “J”, 268, 271, 347, 432, 546, 860, 2 Latvian Police regiments and 1 Latvian regiment of border guards.
7. The analyses of the records at our disposal give evidence that the Nazi government was forced to involve local formations, including the Latvian ones, in fulfilling the Police and Security service as well as to struggle against the partisan movement. The investigation of all the circumstances related to the appearance and activities of these military formations in the area of Byelorussia enables us to substantially enrich our views on this time period, which was tragic to our peoples.
LATVIA UNDER TWO OCCUPATIONAL POWERS: PROBLEMS AND PARADIGMS

1. The friendship treaty signed by the USSR and Germany on 23 August 1939, which has gone down in history as the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, actually meant the union of Stalin and Hitler against the freedom of the peoples of the world, in the first place by destroying the independence of East European states. It brought many millions of people to ruin and directly ushered in World War Two. The totalitarian empires that sixty years ago carved up the national territories of independent states have now collapsed, but many crimes made possible by that pact have not yet been thoroughly evaluated. To this day heirs the imperial traditions make claims against the states occupied through the acts of aggression outlined in the pact, as if the pact were still in force.

The Latvian state and its citizens suffered both from the friendship of the two totalitarian states, and from their war, because the pact's secret protocols provided its signers a pretext, based on "class solidarity", for the occupation of Latvia on 17 June 1940, and a moral justification for the crimes of both occupying powers in Latvia. The pact's secret protocols conflicted with the international obligations of both signing parties, in particular with the USSR's obligations springing from the Russian-Latvian peace treaty of 11 August 1920.

2. Comprehensive analysis of the pact and its consequences has thus far been hindered by several circumstances: 1) unwillingness of some West European politicians to recall their immorality in signing the Munich accord; 2) the alliance of the democratic superpowers with one totalitarian regime against the other during World War II, thereby entering into compromises with it; and 3) the prolonged efforts of Soviet leaders to prevent examination of the subject, even by denying the very existence of the secret protocols.

3. The Molotov-Ribbentrop pact was only one episode in the amity of these totalitarian states, which gained momentum after the spring of 1939, when Molotov replaced Litvinov as the Soviet foreign minister. This friendship continued until 22 June 1941, when Germany breached this agreement of thieves and, in violation of the treaty's secret protocols, sought to eliminate the USSR's influence in Eastern Europe. After World War II, the Soviet Union expanded beyond the territorial acquisitions delineated in its treaty with Hitler, but lost them entirely when it collapsed itself due to the liberation struggles of captive nations, including the Latvian nation. In August 1991 Russia, the legal heir of the USSR, once again recognised Latvia's independence. Since that time only the most aggressively imperialist-minded consider Latvia part of the Soviet or Russian sphere of influence.
4. Both treaty signatories, which soon became occupying powers, had similar plans in Latvia. These called for annexing Latvia, destroying or deporting a large percentage of Latvian citizens, and settling a large number of their own citizens in Latvia, where they would have various privileges in comparison to the citizens of occupied Latvia. Both occupying powers planned to use Latvia, its territory, its economy, its natural and human resources as a springboard for further expansion in the struggle for world domination. Both occupying powers made certain adjustments to their policy and plans during the course of occupation. These changes did not alter the basic goals of the occupiers: to destroy the Latvian nation and appropriate its territory. The fact that the occupying powers carried out their criminal intentions in Latvia more slowly than had been originally planned was a combined result of their weakness and desire to fully exploit the labour force resources and fruits of Latvian residents' labour, not of moral considerations.

5. Both occupying powers sought to kill or deport not only Latvians, but also other ethnic groups in Latvia. The USSR's genocide against Latvians in the occupied Latvia, which began in 1940 and was particularly bloody until Stalin's death in 1953, was only a continuation of the genocide against expatriate Latvians in the Soviet Union, which had begun already in 1937 and 1938. At the same time, Germany's genocide of Latvia's Jews in 1941 was only a continuation of the genocide against Jews in Germany, which had assumed large proportions by 1938. During the occupation Latvia's Latvians and Jews were the main victims of annihilation, but Gypsies, Germans, and Poles suffered heavily too, as did those Russians who had emigrated to Latvia after the Civil War in Russia. Mobilisation of Latvian residents into the occupying armies was one form of the occupiers' genocide. The occupiers' goal of fundamentally altering Latvia's ethnic makeup through genocide and colonisation has been achieved at least in part, for today the proportion of Latvians, Germans and Jews in Latvia is much lower than before the occupation.

6. In implementing their policies, both occupying powers made broad use of society's criminal and déclassé elements. The occupiers sought to include particular social and ethnic groups – certain minorities and some expatriate Latvian from Russia – in the government apparatus. Even before the occupation the totalitarian states were preparing a reserve of popular collaborationists, in order to use them immediately after the occupation in puppet governments. The most popular German agent for this task was the pilot Herberts Cukurs, whose activities during the Latvian occupation were not mentioned, since he was working for the Gestapo at that time. One influential Soviet agent was the writer Vilis Lacis, who held high positions during the occupation. Collaborationism – active co-operation with and assistance to the occupiers - should not be confused with conformism – non-resistance and compliance, so as not to provoke reprisals. In the earlier phases of both occupying regimes, when Latvian citizens were killed for undesirable class or racial identity according to prepared lists, conformism had little relevance. But as the occupation was prolonged, Latvian residents had to participate in one way or another in Latvia's economic and cultural
life, in order to avoid total decline and national demoralisation. Such participation should not be considered collaborationism, although the distinction is very fine and changes over time.

7. For nations that were victims of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, it is important to consider the victimological aspect of the secret protocols: namely, would more intelligent and unified action on the part of the pact's victims have been capable of preventing or lessening the destruction wrought by the pact? It is hard to draw firm conclusions here, for different actions by the victims would have met different actions by the occupying powers. The worst consequences of the occupation -- the physical destruction of a large proportion of the nation and the settling in the Baltic nations' territory of many ethnically foreign colonists oriented toward the occupying power -were experienced least in Lithuania, because there young men were not drafted en masse into the occupying armies, and after the war fewer colonists from the USSR settled there. To date the question has not yet been studied of whether this difference resulted from a higher level of state-consciousness on the part of the Lithuanian nation, or from other factors.

8. Questions connected with the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact reflect the interests of different, mutually opposed social forces. Therefore, it is hard to find words and concepts that precisely illustrate the processes being examined and make it possible to get closer to the truth through discussion. It is hard to understand the period from 17 June 1940 to 21 August 1991, if it is described with such phrases as: the time of serfdom, the period of building developed socialism, the time of foreign domination, the era of colonial dependence, the time of brotherly assistance, the period of forming mature communism. The most appropriate description might be the period of occupations, which includes both periods of totalitarian domination. The true meaning and significance of the events this period have thus far been frequently falsified. Along with direct alteration of facts, another frequently used method of historical falsification has been to use as synonyms words or phrases which are not equivalent in meaning. In such falsifications, the change of occupiers is often called liberation, and the victory of Latvia's occupiers is called Latvia's victory, although it is clear that an occupied country cannot in principle enjoy victory until it has regained its freedom. The greatest hypocrisy in deforming the understanding of events in occupied Latvia can be found in the vocabulary of institutions of the Soviet occupation and their fellow-travellers, since the German institutions, especially at the beginning of their occupation, usually did not hesitate to use quite cynical formulations -- Jewish-Bolshevik regime, Slavic untermenschen, higher race. Apologists of the Soviet occupation often referred to Soviet saboteurs in Latvia as partisans, to implementers of Stalinist totalitarian policy as anti-Hitlerite coalition fighters, to Latvia's colonisation with USSR citizens as brotherly assistance, to genocide of the Latvian nation as the struggle against bourgeois nationalism.

Institutions of the Soviet occupation often used stock propaganda phrases, which in the Latvian situation had a very vague content or no content at all. Such stock phrases included "the Great Patriotic War", "the Soviet people", "the moral-political unity of the Soviet people", "enemies of the people" and
many others. The words "fascists" and "anti-fascists" were also typically used by Soviet occupiers so broadly that they lost content and meaning.

9. The Molotov-Ribbentrop pact brought much destruction to the nations of Eastern Europe, but it brought no blessings to the signing states and nations, either. After fifty years of occupation the nations of Eastern Europe have liberated themselves and renewed their statehood. However, their living force has been greatly weakened, and especially their intellectual elite. The legal heirs of the totalitarian states have thus far not apologised to the occupied nations for the crimes of their forebearers. Russian state officials still declare that the Russian – Latvian Peace Treaty signed on 11 August 1920 has lost its power due to the Molotov- Ribbentrop pact’s secret protocols. The ideological heirs of totalitarianism occasionally seek to place the blame for their predecessors' crimes on the occupied nations themselves.

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LATVIA AT THE TEHERAN AND YALTA CONFERENCES – ISSUES AND SOURCES

The Allied Teheran Conference was held from 28 November to 1 December 1943. This was the first time that Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill met together, they were attended by diplomatic and military advisers. The major topic of discussion was the second front, which was to be launched in May 1944 (but in fact was delayed until June). Latvia was not a topic for general discussion, although the Baltic were mentioned in a private meeting between Roosevelt and Stalin on 1 December. Roosevelt said at that time that while he was not prepared to go to war for the Baltics, he was not able to publicly recognize their incorporation into the Soviet Union – that his public would not understand that and he had decided that he would have to run for President one more time in the 1944 elections.

The Yalta Conference took place from 4 to 11 February 1945. Present were Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin, as well as their diplomatic and military advisers, totalling some 700 people. Diplomatic discussions on the shape of the postwar world dominated the agenda. There was no discussion of Latvia or Latvians at Yalta. However, there was one document that was signed at Yalta that received very little attention from the general public for decades and that was decisive for the fate of Latvians: that was the Yalta Agreement on the Repatriation of Prisoners of War and Civilians. This document came to be interpreted to mean that Soviet citizens had to be repatriated to the Soviet Union irrespective of their individual, personal wishes and, if necessary, by forces. On
the basis of this agreement the British repatriated some two and a quarter million and the Americans some two millions individuals to the Soviet Union – including the vast majority of “Vlasov’s Army”. The Soviets would have liked to have repatriated the Balts as well. They clamoured for this throughout the early postwar years. Balts were not repatriated, because the Yalta Agreement had not defined Soviet citizen. When, soon after the conference, it was seen that in fact a definition was required, the British and Americans defined Soviet citizens as people who had been citizens of the Soviet Union when the Second War broke out, that is, on 1 September 1939. Thus, Balts did not come under this definition and therefore did not get repatriated. This, in fact, is the subject of my dissertation which is almost completed.

American sources for these conferences are, in terms of accessibility, first, the documents in the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series, which are published, and, second, archival materials in the National Archives at College Park, Maryland (just outside of Washington, DC). To my knowledge there are not published reports based on Soviet archives of the topic Latvians and/or Balts at the Teheran and Yalta conferences. It would be very interesting to find out what these materials have to say.

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THE ARCHIVES OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC ON LATVIA DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR

The documents concerning Latvian soldiers are located in the Military Archives in Prague. The represent a small part of the SS-Archives, which were transferred from Berlin to Zasmuky at Czech town Kolin near Prague by German authorities at the end of The Second World War. There are two types of documents located here. Some fragments describe the training of Latvian soldiers in the training-centre of German army near Benešov in Central Bohemia. The other type of documents contains fragments of reports on casualties of SS-D-15 Waffen-Gren.D der SS / lettische Nr.1/ during their retreat in the beginning of 1945 /60 persons/ and reports of total casualties of Latvian SS Frw.Legion during August 1944.

Unfortunately, fragmentary character of documents enable to use them only as a supplement of research.

Another, more complex type of documents is represented by the collection “Kommando Staab Reichsführer SS“ from years 1941-1943. The command was created by 5.6.1941 from original formation „Einsatzstaab RF SS“, which had
been formed in Treskau near Posen in April 1941 and then in Arys in Eastern Prussia. KdoS RF SS was composed of three SS brigades / 1.SS-Infantry-Brigade, 2.SS – Infantry-Brigade, SS Cavalry-Brigade and other small units. The main task of formation was the fight against partisans aiming /in Himler’s words/ to the „total cleansening of areas, which had been captured by the army, and the liberation of civilians from the partisans and their hangers-on“, what meant liquidation of Jews and communists. Himmler limited task of his special elite troops on cleansening of rear and tried to avoid their direct engagement on the front. During their operations the units were subordinated to local command „Höhere SS – und Polizeiführer“ of the area of destination /Nord, Ostland, Mitte a Süd/. For our purpose is the most important HSSUPF Ostland in Riga, ev.Nord with the command to the 2nd Infantry-SS Brigade, which was operating in area of Latvia and southern Estonia during August and September 1941. However, because of small resistance and quick consolidation of conquered Baltic areas under German control the centre of gravity of activities was concentrated from the beginning on White Russia, Ukraine and later Russia, where SS-brigades annihilated Jews and strong partisan movement. The most extensive action was realised in Pripjat swamps. During August – October 1942 the SS units were ordered to crush successful partisan movement in White Russian swamps /Action “Sumfieber”/. Latvian police battalions Nr.18, 19, 21, 26 took part in this extensive, but only partly successful campaign, too.

The brigades were in spite of Himmler’s original negative attitude engaged with the Red Army on the front under the high command of Wehrmacht in 1942. In next year the SS-brigades were gradually withdrawn from the Eastern front and entrusted with other tasks in Germany and the staff /KdoS RF SS/ was joined by Himmler’s order to this direct personal command in September. The materials from the archives inform not only about the activity of the SS troops /war diaries, situation reports/, but also about the situation in the occupied areas / reports and analysis of the intelligence service/.

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GERMAN OCCUPATION PERIOD DOCUMENTS IN THE LATVIAN STATE ARCHIVES (FOND REVIEW)

The 90s in all the Eastern European countries were marked by a rapid collapse of the totalitarian regime. Latvia was one of the countries where the disintegration of the regime was fast and thus provided an opportunity of building an open society.
Latvia is a country that in the 20th century was effected by several occupations. Both National Socialistic and communistic ideology precluded freedom of thought, political and economic independence. This has left heavy economic, social, demographic and psychological consequences in Latvian society. Research and analyses of these consequences could be one of the first steps in development of new political, economic and social relations.

After the state independence was regained the Latvian Archives were fully opened to public. They preserve a considerable documentation on both last occupations. Provision of appraisal, organisation and availability of this information is one of the key tasks of the Latvian archives.

The paper will attempt to analyse and broadly characterise the groups of history sources to be found in the fonds of the largest Latvian archives (Latvian State History Archives and Latvian State Archives), which until now have been insufficiently used. They can provide a relatively comprehensive information on manifestations of German occupation power in Latvia and, firstly, on functioning details of the German civil administration. It is to be noted that there was a time when due to political motivation the fonds of German occupation period were divided between the two above archives. In my presentation I will provide more detailed analysis of the holdings of the State Archives of Latvia.

As widely known, on 17 July 1941 Hitler established a special ministry for the occupied Eastern regions (Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete) and A. Rozenbers was appointed as its head. It was proposed to assign to the new structure all the authority except the supreme police authority, railways and communications areas where the military activities had ceased. Railways and communications on 17 July 1941, with the Hitler’s order, were subjected to the respective German ministries but the police apparatus, due to the above order, found itself in a double subjection. The Supreme police authority was in the hands of the SS Reichsführer and the Head of German Police Himmler while the SS and police chiefs in Reichs Commissariats, General Commissariats and Gebiete Commissariats were directly and in person subjected to the respective Commissars. A conclusion dominant in history literature is that the police authorities in fact were more considering the instructions made by the Supreme SS leadership than the German civil authority. On the same date with another order Hitler incorporated Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Byelorussia in one administrative unit – Ostland. The NSVSP organisations did not create a parallel apparatus and the heads of the German civil institutions in personal union performed the functions of the chairmen of the NSVSP. This explains why the Head of the district organisation of the NSVSP Heinrich Lose was appointed as the Reich Commissar when the Ostland Reich Commissariat was established. On 18 August 1941 in Kaunas, the Ostland Reich Commissariat issued an order thereby taking over the civil authority in Ostland, while the military authority remained with the Ostland Commander of Armed Forces. It seems appropriate to outline the structure of the Ostland Reich Commissariat in order to better understand the functioning of its institutions. The Ostland Reich Commissariat included 4 general regions: Riga, Kaunas, Tallinn and Minsk. Latvia was divided in 6 districts. It is to be noted that in comparison with other 5 Latvian districts the
Riga city district was excluded from the subjection to the Latvian General Commissariat. The German civil authority was introduced in all Latvia starting from 1 September 1941.

It is to be marked that the research on World War II military activities in the documents of Latvian archives during the communist regime was hindered by the fact that all the documents pertaining to the German occupation period were under secret preservation and the Theses which were made by using these archives were presented in a so-called secret presentation procedure. This necessitates researchers to carry out a huge work of identification and analyses of documentary materials by comparing the existing history sources in Latvia with the sources available in foreign archives. As many documents of German occupation were drafted secretly and did not reach the archives or were destroyed, such activity would be highly appreciated. Without identification of the history sources existent in foreign archives, it is not possible to objectively show the historical procedures Ostland and the actual functioning mechanism of the German occupation power.

Reminder of some facts referring to the establishment, functioning and subordination of the institutions of Ostland civil authority allows us to outline the main fond groups preserved in the Latvian Archives. In terms of subordination the most significant is the State ministry fond of the occupied Eastern regions (fond 1018), which contains the orders, instructions and recommendations issued by the State Minister A. Rozenbers and addressed to the Reich Commissars. All these fond documents are preserved in the Latvian State Archives. The same refers also to the documents of the Ostland Reich Commissariat, which is subjected to the State Ministry of the Occupied Eastern regions. The largest proportion of the documents is also being preserved in the above archives. This is also the case with the documents of the various religious confessions functioning in Latvia and Latvian statistics authority during the German occupation. The documents of the German civil authority in Ostland preserved in the Latvian State Archives are comparatively fragmentary, nevertheless they also can provide information about the operation of the Ostland Reich Commissariat. In this respect fond 70 – the Ostland Reich Commissariat is a rich information source. The fond preserves orders and instructions about the provisions for army, procedure and prices for acquisition of agricultural goods, statistical reports on Ostland population and economic situation in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, also recommendations for preparing Ostland budget, etc. Next most important group of history sources is to be found in fond 69 – Riga General Commissar. The fond preserved data about labour policy and social protection, use of labour force, rights and remuneration, regulation of private life. The documents from this fond provide us with information that prove the endeavours of the occupation to divide the population of Latvia in legally unequal groups, mainly by ethnic criteria. The documents prove that Germans and people related to Germans in the country were subjected only to German administration and German courts. This caused not only legal but also economic privileges as well as privileges in working conditions, remuneration and leisure for the Germans and the related to Germans in Latvia. This strict ethnic differentiation will probably appear also in other materials of any subject to be investigated.
When comparing the documents of both archives, we can see that the major part of the documents preserved in the Latvian State Archives is constituted by the documents of the so-called Latvian self-administration established during the German occupation. Latvian self-administration officially was founded on 7 March 1942 and directly subjected to the German Civil Authority, which maintained the supreme management and control. Latvian self-administration consisted of General Directorates. At the head of each General Directorate was a Latvian General Director. The rights of General Directorate were only to meet the instructions made by Riga General Commissar. The Latvian State Archives have comparatively fully preserved documents of all the General Directorates. Each General Director was an expert in a certain sector and was directly accountable to the Riga General Commissar. The General Director of the Interior was seen as the first one and represented the whole self-administration. Subject to approval of the General Commissar, he distributed function to other General Directors, however he was not their chairman and could not dismiss them but like them was an authorised person of the General Commissar. The self-administration system incorporated the authorities of cities (except Riga), districts and parishes. The General Director of the Interior provided the overall management of the local administrative institutions.

The 20 fonds of the Latvian State Archives preserve the documents of the so-called Latvian self-administration general directorates (6580 files in total). Of interest could be also the documents of the Riga City Main and Personal Board and its subordinated structures.

It is to be added that the mentioned documents are not described according to the provenance, which may cause certain difficulties for the researchers. The fond description was effected by Soviet time historiography guidelines, therefore the Archival personnel still have to carry out a rather extensive work in organising the fond documents in compliance with the provenance principle and developing an exact reference apparatus.

The following conclusions are made in the final part:
1. The archival fonds preserve incomplete documents of all the General districts of the Ostland Reich Commissariat.
2. Since the overall Ostland matters, apart from Reichadministerium für die besten Ostgebiete were supervised by several German government and military institutions, our archival fonds preserve also the documents of the key institutions determining the Ostland supreme military matters.
3. The archival fonds preserve materials about courts, Prosecutors office, SS, SD and separate army structures.
LATVIAN PRESS DURING THE PERIOD OF NAZI OCCUPATION

The structure and functions of the Latvian mass media were completely determined by the occupation regime directly or through Latvian journalists, submitted to it of their free will or under compulsion. Latvia was occupied by a totalitarian superpower whose ideology was based on the concepts of Nazism. According to these concepts Latvians were regarded as much more lower-rate people than occupants themselves. Appropriate mass media were created for individuals of the second or even third sort. The theme considered is very broad, versatile and still unexplored, therefore in the lecture only some, in the lecturer's opinion most significant aspects of the matter will be examined.

1. Total censorship of the press, its absolute submission to the aims of Nazi propaganda.

2. Creation of a new uniform and barren structure of the press, in some cases manipulating with the names of editions of the independence period shut down by the Soviet regime. Some media issued or edited by chiefs of repressive bodies (e.g. the Head of Latvian SD (Security Service) of Jelgava District M. Vagulāns).

3. Savage anti-Semitic propaganda, associating Jews with the crimes of the Soviet regime to give an ideological motivation for expulsion of Jews from social life, humiliating and killing them. However, frequent threats and warnings in the Nazi press to Latvians who would try to help Jews gave evidence that Nazi anti-Semitic propaganda did not succeed in all objectives intended; and of human feelings of broad masses of Latvian population against the persecuted part of the people of Latvia as well.

4. Efforts to erase the key concept of Latvian statehood "Nation of Latvia" from the society's mind, replacing it everywhere with the term "Latvians". Staining of the reputation of state bodies (Saeima) and political leaders (K. Ulmanis, Z. Meierovics, V. Munters) of the independent Latvian Republic.

5. Obtrusive propaganda and explanation of Nazi ideology.

6. Using mass media to propagate different actions carried out by the occupation regime. Trying to create a propagand illusion of support by all the nation to every undertaking of the occupation regime.
7. A particular matter, completely untouched up to now by historical literature and source studies is Nazi occupation time film documents - newsreels and propaganda movies. A large number of these documents is owned by the Latvian State Phonophotofilm Archives. The essential problems in the research of film documents of that time are establishing of exact dates of the documents and estimating the ratio of objective truth, propaganda and produced episodes.

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ANTI-SEMITISM IN THE LATVIAN PRESS PUBLISHED DURING THE NAZI OCCUPATION PERIOD

1. Already before 22 June 1941 the SS activists in Germany (R. Heidrihs) were planning a comprehensive anti-Semitic propaganda in the Baltic countries occupied by the German army. For this purpose it was planned to use the former members of the Pērkonkrusts. The Nazi occupants hoped that this propaganda will arise an anti-Semitic hysteria and the Jewish pogroms, which were supposed to be interpreted to the world as Latvian racist actions, as a revenge to the Jews for their support to the Soviet occupation power. In summer 1941 the Institute of anti-Semitism was established in Riga, which furnished the press with materials for anti-Semitic articles, its staff consisted of active authors.

2. Since August 1941, in Riga, the Nazi occupation administration published their newspaper “Deutsche Zeitung im Ostland” in German, which featured anti-Semitic writings containing the key National Socialistic opinions on the issue of Jews. However publications of such content appeared rather rarely, sometimes with pseudo-scientific content – or as an information about Jews in different European countries. They did not contain call for cruel reprisals. The intonation changed in 1944 when the newspaper “warned” the Latvians against Jewish revenges for “spontaneous actions” against Jews which had occurred there during the “entrance of German army”. Thus the Nazis tried to enhance the Latvian resistance against the attacking Soviet army.

3. At the second half of 1941 and the first half of 1942, the anti-Semitic articles are very often published in the press which are released in the occupied Latvia in Latvian: the newspapers “Tēvija”, “Zemgale”, “Kurzemes vārds”, “Tālavietis”, “Ventas balss”, “Daugavas Vēstnesis”, the magazine “Laikmets” etc. There could be found both re-published articles from German press and the writings of local advocates of anti-Semitism. Especially active were the members of “Pērkonkrusts” and their fellow-runners, who where writing for the press
already in the 20s and 30s, until the anti-Semitic propaganda was prohibited in Latvia in 1935.

The anti-Semitic articles of 1941-1944 are defined by certain range of themes.
- Attempt to blame the Jewish ethnose and minority in Latvia for the whole policy of the Bolsevik occupation power and crimes. This is the “argumentation” for the necessity to annihilate the Jews - the Holocaust.
- Shaming and pronouncing curses upon those Latvians that were compassionate with the Jews during the persecutions and tried to help them, and also to save them. The anti-Semitic authors urge not to pity any Jew, including children and old people.
- Spreading lies about the national idea of the independent Republic of Latvia, by stating that by 15 May 1934 Latvia was virtually governed by Jews and Latvian achievements have served to enhance their wealth. These publications present also the authoritarian government of K. Ulmanis as a power effected by the Jews and Masons. The foreign policy of Latvia is blamed for having inclination towards the “Jewish England”, which is why in 1939-1940 Latvia found itself in international isolation. In the viewpoint of anti-Semites the Latvian national freedom started only in 1941, with the entrance of the German Army.
- Calumniation of democracy and liberalism (“forms of Jewish governance”) combined with the statements that the USA and England were non-national countries ruled by the Jewish –Masons, which had caused the world war with a view to devastate the European Arian nations and establish the “Zion dictatorship” all over the world. This is how the Nazis and collaborationists tried to misinform the Latvian nation, to deprive the nation of its awareness, fully subject it to the nationalistic Germany and force to serve implicitly for its benefit.

The Nazi anti-Semitic propaganda failed to destroy the Latvian sympathy for Western democracy and orientation towards the Western countries. The hopes were cherished that this democracy will eventually win both the Nationalistic and Bolshevistic totalitarianism.

4. In 1942-1944 anti-Semitism in Latvia was actively propagated also by the publications in Russian, conforming with the Nazis – the newspaper “Dvinskij Vestnik”, “Za Rodinu”, “Dobrovolec”, the magazine “Novij Putj” etc. These especially negatively evaluate the role of Jews in Russian history, by ascribing to Judaism and Jewish society both the establishment of Bolshevik power, and the organisation of the “Stalin- Kaganovich” terror acts – a genocide against Russian people. These characterisations present the symbiosis of the views hold by the Nazi racism and the Russian Blackhundreds. This propaganda particularly widened with the formation of the General A. Vlasov’s “Russian liberation army”. Then its ideologists as one of their fundamental goals announced the “fight against the world’s Jewesness”. In this context there have been attempts to justify also the participation of the Vlasov’s division in military operations against the allied forces and national partisans in Italy and France.

On the whole it can be said that the anti-Semitic propaganda in Latvia during the Nazis occupation time promoted the Holocaust. However it did not succeed in creating in population a continuous and deep hatred and disrespect
towards the Jews. The attempt to withdraw Latvians, Russians and other nations from the ideas of humanism and trans-ethnical tolerance was a failure.

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**SEIZURE, REGISTRATION, RENTAL AND SALE: THE STRANGE CASE OF THE GERMAN ADMINISTRATION OF JEWISH MOVEABLE PROPERTY IN LATVIA, 1941-1944**

Significant fragments of the documentary record concerning the fate of Jewish moveable property in Latvia can be found in western archives. More extensive records are also present in the local Latvian archives. Their records indicate the not inconsiderable efforts undertaken by the Germans to collect, register and administration this property to the benefit of the German Reich. As within Germany itself and other occupied countries, such as Norway, the high costs of administration effectively consumed much of the Jewish wealth that was seized. The Germans generally took the best furniture for their own official use and forwarded gold and jewelry to Berlin. Following a detailed census of Jewish and other heiress property at the end of 1942 Latvians were forced either to rent, buy or return any Jewish property known to be in their possession.

What do these extensive records tell us about Latvian society during the German occupation? Certainly there is strong evidence of collaboration in the anti-Jewish measures. In Riga, for example, a number of local *Schutzmänner* applied for permission to obtain items of furniture from the ghetto. Amongst the reasons cited in justification of these requests were personal participation in the clearing of the ghetto, losses of personal property suffered at the hands of the Soviet occupying forces and the impossibility of obtaining such items in the usual manner from the shops. Other acquired Jewish property through looting, legal purchase or by taking items into safe-keeping. Greed was not the only motive in these actions, but undoubtedly it formed a substantial element.

The initial distribution of property was often made with a view to the needs of the remaining community. Individual peasants were allowed the use of horses and cattle on a loan basis. Tools and furniture were made available to schools and hospitals and local government, which certainly needed specific items. The proceeds from Jewish property was sold was diverted primarily to the ailing finances of the German administration in the East. Strict laws were passed with the aim of preventing individuals from profiting “excessively” from Jewish property.

The truth remains, however, that the open and brutal nature of the arrest and slaughter of the Jews in Latvia left few local inhabitants in doubt as to the
tainted nature of Jewish property. The initial registration forms filled in by police chiefs and local officials in the summer of 1941 frequently list the former Jewish owners by name. Personal items are listed in minute details, including everything from livestock and poultry to bed linen and musical instruments. The eagerness shown in local applications to the authorities and the high demand for auctioned items indicate little respect for the lives and goods of their former Jewish neighbors.

The administration and processing of Jewish property in fact lasted for the duration of the occupation. In the initial chaotic phase, when the Jews of Latvia’s towns and villages were rounded up and killed, official registrations and collections remained only partial. Some property was taken by the mobile killing squads or those first able to loot the empty properties. Furniture was inherited by Germans or locals assigned to the empty Jewish apartments. Military and police units, German officials and needy individuals were assigned specific items by the variety of official posts, primarily on a loan basis. Meanwhile care was that the property of those forcibly deported to the Soviet Union should be taken into trusteeship, awaiting their possible return.

The systematic exploitation of Jewish property as a source of income for the German administration only commenced retrospectively. Laws were passed in the autumn of 1941 establishing that all Jewish property belonged to the German state and should be registered. In 1942 a Trusteeship office took over responsibility for real estate and any remaining property in the Riga ghetto. Property secured in the regions was also processed and forwarded via Riga in 1942 and 1943. The most valuable items were sent on to Berlin and that which was not taken by German offices was sold off. Watches in need of repair were sent to the ghetto craftsmen to be put into working order. The salaries of those administering and evaluating Jewish property were paid from the income in terms of property rentals and sale.

In the autumn of 1942 a further detailed property census was carried out for the whole of Latvia. Both Germans and Latvians had to register all property of Jewish origin, even if it was purchased legally; those without Jewish property also had to sign a blank form to this effect. The Germans suspected nevertheless widespread evasion by the locals. This opened the door to denunciations and the investigation of those suspected of concealing any new found wealth. Even some remaining Jews were uncovered during the course of this investigation process.

A surprising development was the exploitation by the German state of the property thereby declared. Assessors were sent out to estimate the value of the items registered. On this basis either a monthly rental fee of one hundredth of the full price was charged, or in many cases, a sale was negotiated slightly below the assessed price. A percentage of the price was also paid to the assessor as a commission. The high costs in salaries, storage space, assessment and sheer paperwork in fact consumed much of the expected revenue.

In terms of former Jewish real estate and business the picture was complicated by the widespread nationalizations conducted by the Soviets. This nationalized property was taken over on masse by the German state property company (Grundstücksgesellschaft), but extensive German records also indicate those Jewish properties which had remained in private hands. Bank and savings accounts, stocks and shares, and foreign currency were also expropriated by the German authorities in the months following their arrival. Collection during arrest
and execution and the search of empty apartments revealed especially silver items, jewelry (wedding rings), money and other mobile wealth.

It is difficult to assess precisely who benefited most from the annihilation of the Jewish minority in Latvia. The German rules and regulations served to limit the extent to which individual Latvians were able to profit personally. Much revenue was directed towards the local German administration and the German war effort, no to mention the costs of property administration itself. In a time of wartime shortages of everything from apartments and furniture to clothing and watches, it is understandable that demand for former Jewish property was great. However, in accepting and profiting from such items the extent of complicity in German crimes was extended beyond the small group of active perpetrators to thousands of civilians throughout Latvia. The crime of failing to come to the aid of their neighbors in a time of dire needs was than compounded by inheriting their property, even if the German and later Soviet administration left them little joy of these ill-gotten gains.

In conclusion, the value of these extensive property records lies not only in what they tell us about the German administration. They also contain valuable information about the vanished Jewish communities of Latvia and the participation of the local population in the spoliation of the Jews. The current process of reassessing the past is driven primarily by the aim to put outstanding injustices and to help clarify the historical record. In this difficult task I offer my support to the Latvian Historical Commission and do not wish to prejudge their conclusions. Nevertheless, in order to understand the conflicting claims it is above all necessary to reconstruct the process of expropriation as it occurred successively during the Soviet and German occupations. The widespread expropriation of Jewish property under Soviet rule exposes once again the false myth of Jewish support for the Bolsheviks. I therefore recommend a close examination of the German property registration records as an essential part of the process of reconciliation and final restitution. It is necessary for Latvians to understand as far as possible exactly what took place on Latvian soil between 1941 and 1944. The deadly attack on the Jews and their property orchestrated by the Germans with Latvian aid was in fact a mortal blow against the freedom of Latvia itself.

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UNIFICATION THROUGH PILLARISATION: THE CASE OF THE NETHERLANDS AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR

In the early morning of 10th May 1940 the Kingdom of the Netherlands was invaded by the superior army and air force of Nazi Germany. The attack was without any provocation. Nor was war declared. Caught by surprise the Dutch armed forces were no match for the enemy. The Dutch population of about 10
million people was subjected to a full five years of German occupation. The Dutch cabinet, Queen Wilhelmina and her family had seen chance to escape to London. The government in exile continued the war. It could dispose of a considerable merchant navy, much needed by the allies. It could also resort to the Netherlands East Indies until the colony fell into the hands of the Japanese in March 1942.

In the Netherlands itself the Germany military administration was in June 1940 taken over by their civil authorities. It was a change for the worse, the Germans not only trying to avail themselves of the Dutch economy as much as possible for their war purposes, but also setting themselves to the ruthless persecution and extermination of the relatively large Jewisch population of about 150,000 people. In the end more than 100,000 of them were deported and killed. Jews had been an accepted and relatively well integrated part of the Dutch society, ever since the early seventeenth century. Anti-semitism was not absent, but it had never become virulant or violent.

The Dutch population was quite unprepared for active resistance. For centuries it had become used to its rather tolerant governement rule and administration. Since the early 19th century it had moreover not taken part in any European war what so ever. During the First World War the Netherlands had succeeded to maintain its strict neutrality and Dutchmen considered themselves true apostles of pace, law, order and world order. They had on the whole no idea of the ugly spirit of national-socialism, although they could have taken teir cue from what was since 1933 happening to the east of their border.

Their domestic scene gave also witness to tranquility. After having fought for their independence against the roman-catholic Habsburg power of Spain in the 17th century, the Dutch had become a protestant nation of varying denominations. However, there had still remained a very large roman-catholic minority, that was more or less accepted into the society. It was never persucuted to any severe extent. After the Frenc revolution roman-catholics and jews were given the same civil rights as all other inhabitants. During this century and the beginnings of the 20th century modernisation and industralisation gained momentum. It proved to be the perfect feeding ground for a very particular form of political mobilisation of the masses. Protestants, roman-catholics, liberals and socialists turned towards organising themselves in speareate parties and institutions: the Dutch society of the first half of the 20th century had become what came to be called “a pillarised society”. It meant that each religious or ideological category had its own party, its own university and schools, its own newspapers, printing press and radio station, its own sport association and so on and so on. Itn was a form of social organisation that could have easily developed as fission fungus, tearing the Dutch society into bits and pieces. To some extent it did. But keeping to their own point of view without trying to force it on others had always been part of Dutch culture, shaped and formed by the perennial need of common defense against the water of sea and river. As each pillar kept to itself the spokesmen and leaders of the people were always ready to come to an understanding with each other. The Dutch political scene thus had become a scene of continous compromising.

It was, however, not an attitude favouring resistance – armed or otherwise – to the German occupying forces. Apart from some minor incidences Dutch resistance did not begin until February 1941, when leftist Amsterdam labourers
went on strike against the deportation of Jews. Although the example was followed in other places the strike was forcefully suppressed. Dutch resistance, however, had begun and as the years passed by it was slowly gathering strength. In the meantime, however, Germany had begun its war against the Soviet-Union. Many Dutchmen, particularly religious people, had been accustomed to consider communism as the root of all evil. Before the war it had been one of the causes of the rise of a relatively unimportant, but very noisy national-socialist party. German propaganda now attracted many thousands of young men to fight on the Eastern front. There were probably more Dutchmen serving in the German army, including the SS, than in the Dutch resistance movements. The majority of the population, however, accommodated itself to the circumstances of war, offering passive resistance at best.

Liberation came to the Netherlands in a quite unexpected, unforeseeable ways. After the Allied invasion in June 1944 it appeared in September 1944 that liberation was now just a matter of days. However, the battle of Arnhem changed the prospects drastically. Only part of the country had been freed, the greater part had to wait long and bitter months of devastation and sheer hunger, for V-day in May 1945. During these months heavy fighting continued, leaving the Netherlands as probably the worst damaged economy of Western Europe, Germany included.

Immediately after the war the government faced enormous tasks. The war damage had to be made good; the nation had to be rebuild completely. At the same time the government let itself to be drawn into the costly en bitter struggle for Indonesian independence. The new international situation put an end to neutrality, creating a strong army instead.

But the main problem that had to be solved as quickly as possible was to reintegrate the society as a unified nation. The Jewish population had all but disappeared. The remaining few, however had to be helped and supported. It was done according to the legal rules that the government in exile had drawn up. It is only now, fifty years later, that it is realised that those rules had left something to wish for. It is, however, probably too late for atonement. Even more pressing, however, was the need for reintegrating people who had collaborated with the enemy. There had been of course, all sorts of collaboration in all sorts of forms and degrees. The problem was to distinguish between what was acceptable and what was not. Opinions naturally differed. On the whole two different ways were taken. Lighter cases were dealt with by a process of “purification”. It was carried out by various committees of trusted men. If condemned “purified” people got some sort of punishment, ranging from a reprimand to paying a fine or a (temporary) prohibition to pursue one’s profession. As there was an enormous number of sectors and committees involved it is impossible to say whether the Dutch purification had been up to the proper standards of justice. There were no doubt more or less serious miscarriages of justice. However this may have been purification served its main purpose: reintegrating people without bloodshed into a society that needed them urgently for shaping its future. By 1950 the process had been pushed through. But even nowadays some bitterness remains.

The other way of dealing with war criminals, traitors and collaborators was of course by the administration of special justice. It had also been prepared by the government in exile. In fact, however, it remained limited to a relatively
small number of cases. In this respect the Dutch have lived up to their reputation of moderateness. With the eye on the future this seemed to be best again.

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FROM HISTORICAL FACTS TO HISTORICAL AWARENESS: PRINCIPLES AND APPROACHES OF THE LATVIAN OCCUPATION MUSEUM.

The paper is based on the proposition that there is a distinction between historical facts and historical awareness. This becomes especially clear in a museum that deals with a painful, controversial period of history whose consequences are alive to this very day, the occupation period from 1940 to 1991. If the historian's work is based mainly on archival research concerning historical facts and their interpretation, the museum must deal also with different levels of knowledge and awareness, different attitudes, preconceptions, and not infrequently biases that its visitors bring with them. These range from total lack of historical knowledge to relatively benign oversimplifications of complex historical issues to deeply ingrained persistent historical legends to gross deliberate ideological distortions of history. The Occupation Museum of Latvia is visited by a wide range of visitors—foreigners, Latvian citizens, victims of the occupation period and the instruments of it, adults and schoolchildren. To build a bridge between facts and the need to create and in many instances change historical awareness, the Museum as a set of guiding principles: (1) it strives to present historical facts in an unbiased manner; (2) it does not accuse peoples or social groups in crimes committed during the occupation but rather totalitarian occupation regimes and their accomplices; (3) it commemorates those who suffered and died because of the occupation, particularly through the artifacts they have entrusted to the Museum; (4) it strives to create a workable consensus for building a tolerant democratic society through historical awareness. The factual aspects are stressed; the emotional ones are understated; the visual arrangement of the museum allows the casual visitor to form at least cursory impressions and the informed visitor to discover new information and make new connections. Within the framework of these principles, the Museum attempts to allow its visitors to come to their own insights and conclusions about the occupation period and its tortured history.
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